www.state.gov/documents/organization/53889.pdf
5 August 1969
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Nigeria: The Federal Military Government's War
Aims vis-a-vis the Ibos
I . The Federal Government's War Aims
1. The federal government's immediate war aim is to
establish federal control over Biafra.
The federal authori-
ties are willing to negotiate an end to the war, but we see
no indications that Lagos would be satisfied with anything
but a settlement on its own terms, including a renunciation
of secession by the Biafrans and the establishment of federal
authority--probably in the form of federal occupation forces--
over the whole of the former Eastern Region. The federal
government almost certainly would not accept General Ojukwu
in any leadership position, and many Nigerians might well
demand his death or imprisonment. There are no indications
that Lagos would consider granting the East-Central State
any special status in the federation. There is a remote
possibility that the Nigerians would consider adjusting the
East-Central State boundaries--possibly even to include a
seaport at the expense of the Rivers State.
2.
Probably the most important long-range goal of those
now in control of the federal military government is that
of ensuring that no single tribe ever again dominates poli-
tics at the federal level. Since the military coup of July
1966, power has been held by minority tribal elements from
the "middlebelt" area--the southern part of the former
Northern Region. At the time of the July coup,
the middle-
belters had the support of the Hausa-Fulanis but this was
primarily because the coup was directed against the then
Ibo regime. The present aims of the middlebelters and the
Hausa-Fulanis coincide, but the minority tribesmen remain
determined to prevent domination of the government by the
Hausa-Fulanis. In our view, an end to the Ibo problem
would almost certainly mark the beginning of serious poli-
tical differences between the minority tribesmen and the
Hausa-Fulanis.
3.
The minority tribesmen now in control of the federal
government are not bent on genocide against the Ibos, and
the top leaders, like General Gowon, will probably take
great pains to prevent the massacre of Ibos if the federal
forces ever do overrun the Biafran enclave. It is almost
certain, however, that a federal victory would result in
anti-Ibo atrocities by front-line troops. The extent of
these would probably depend on the manner in which the
federal victory was achieved.
The war has already gone on
for so long and so much bitterness has built up on both
sides, however, that during the first few days after the
"liberation" there would probably be a fair amount of
retribution particularly against Ibo soldiers and probably
also against civilians. After this, Gowon and his senior
officers would probably be able to contain the atrocities.
II. Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba Intentions Toward the Ibos
4. There is of course no love lost between the Hausa-
Fulanis and the Ibos, and even before the first military
coup in January 1966 there was much pent-up anti-Ibo senti-
ment in the north. Over a million Ibos lived in the former
Northern Region, and because of their education and ambition,
they held the best jobs. The Hausa-Fulanis regarded the
Ibos as pushy, arrogant, treacherous, greedy, and of course
pagan. The depth of the anti-Ibo sentiment was demonstrated
during the September-October 1966 riots in the Northern
Region during which at least 7,000 and possibly twice that
many Ibos were killed.
5. These anti-Ibo feelings have probably become more
intense since the war, and especially as it has become
more and more difficult to explain the federal government's
inability to win a military victory.
Left to themselves,
many, perhaps most, Hausa-Fulanis would probably punish
the Ibos severely for the secession, and given the means,
many northerners might well undertake a bloodbath of major
proportions. Senior Hausa-Fulani officers would probably
try to avoid this, however, and Gowon and the army leaders
from the minority tribes would probably be able to contain
the northern troops who would come into contact with the
Ibos in the event of a federal victory. It is probably
worthwhile to note that thus far in the war there have
been no examples of what would happen if northern troops
gained control of areas of heavy Ibo population, because
the Ibos have evacuated their towns in the face of advancing
federal troops.
6.
The Yorubas are also basically anti-Ibo. The
Westerners see the Ibos as rivals for the better jobs and
as cultural inferiors. Most Yorubas, however, probably
feel much closer to the Ibos in education and background
than to their northern brothers, and probably quite a few
Yorubas sympathize with the Ibo attempt at self-determina-
tion. We do not believe the Yorubas would engage in any
significant amount of atrocities against the Ibos.
III. The Ibo Elite
7. We do not believe that the military leaders intend
to eradicate the Ibo elite, but neither do we believe the
Ibos will be permitted to play any meaningful role in the
federal government for the foreseeable future. T
he federal
leaders almost certainly would not entrust any responsible
federal positions to the Ibos. All the Lagos government
has so far promised is that Ibos would control the East-
Central State and that Ibos would be represented on the
Federal Executive Council. We believe representation in
the latter would probably be at best token, and that
although Ibo civilians might be permitted to hold posi-
tions in the state government, the federal government would
probably insist on federal occupation forces in Biafra.
8. It is difficult to see any peaceful resolution of
the problem of the Ibo elite if the federal government
regains control of Biafra. Federal leaders appear firmly
committed to the division of the former Eastern Region
into three states--a factor which has won considerable support
for Lagos among the Eastern minority tribes. If the Eastern
Region is so divided, the Ibo elite would be confined to a
very small, essentially rural area. These Ibos would not be
accepted with ease in the other two eastern states or the
Midwest State, and they would probably be afraid to move to
the northern states. The Western and Lagos States already
have a relative abundance of trained manpower among the
Yorubas. Under the best of circumstances the confinement
of the majority of the Ibo elite would provide significant
problems for neighboring states, and under the circumstances
which would prevail after the war, this situation would
probably be a continuing source of serious trouble.
http://maxsiollun.wordpress.com/my-book/ 
United States Government Memo on Biafra 
) were not left out of the "memo" so I think discussing the role and intentions of the Yoruba in this context is quite relevant. We may however disagree with FSU on other grounds.
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