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Oil Politics and Violence: Nigeria's Military Coup Culture (1966-1976)
by Max Siollun.


Reviewed by ohsee


What is history and what purpose does it serve? Is it an accumulation of “stubborn” facts as some Mr. Gradgrinds here recently stated? Is it “a unique opportunity of recording, in the way most useful to the greatest number, the fullness of …knowledge…” (Lord Acton)? Or is it impossible to write an objective history in which “a hard core of historical facts objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian” (Edward Hallet Carr)?

These questions may seem trivial in a comfortable world in which ennui and skepticism about historical “truth” are marks of sophistication; in Nigeria, they are matters of life and death. People there die as a result of history forgot, of lessons not learned. Many people die.

Such questions of history’s veracity are most pertinent when they concern Nigeria’s violent political history in the first two decades after independence. The most problematic issues have revolved around questions of what really happened during the first two coups and the resultant civil war. These are areas where Nigerians need to know the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, because such reliable knowledge has proved valuable in the past, and will matter greatly in the future. But where Nigerians wrote histories about those turbulent times, the works were often deeply clouded by the malodorous presence of ethnic chauvinism and hatred of the Other. Many readers despaired of ever seeing an unbiased history from Nigerians themselves, and sought such objectivity from outsiders who often had little understanding of the subtleties of the Nigerian political milieu.

Thus Mr. Siollun’s book about the first four coups (1966-1976) must be considered something of a miracle. Unlike prior writers on the topic from that country, the Nigerian born historian successfully checked at the door the ethnic biases he surely must have, in order to combine the dispassionate objectivity of the outsider with the nuanced knowledge of the insider. The result is a truly brilliant book that is highly accessible to the general reader, and has enough new information to serve as a starting point for future investigators who wish to tackle some of the issues in greater detail.

Mr Siollun, whose essays about the first two coups are familiar to those who visit Nigerian websites, has tackled the coups sequentially, and shown how they are related in terms of personnel involved and lessons to be learned. For instance, some of the participants in the second coup—such as Babangida, Abacha, Yaradua, Buhari—dominated Nigerian coup-making culture for thirty years. The failure of the beneficiaries of coups to punish murderous putschists came back to bite them in the behind, since “unpunished coup plotters will re-offend. The coup plotters behind Nigeria’s military regimes were repeat offenders—often with fatal consequences for themselves. They were men who lived life on the edge, snacked on danger and dined on death. For them, coup plotting was in the blood.”

Those on this site who have asked for a readable book on what happened in 1966 should run, not walk, to the bookstore (virtual or otherwise) to get a copy. Mr. Siollun’s summary of the pre-coup political situation is concise, and lucid, and looks at the events in new ways. For instance, were you aware that the Nzeogwu coup was merely the second attempt at overthrowing the Balewa government by force? While many may know that Awo was jailed for treason, few are aware that it was not a trumped up charge, and that three decades later, Action Group General Secretary, S.G. Ikoku, confirmed that there was a genuine AG plot to topple the federal government.

Mr. Siollun is at his strongest where he skillfully cuts away the myths that have grown weed-like around the more controversial of those events. One of the more pernicious—and dangerous—of these is the lie that the January 15 1966 coup was an effort at Igbo domination organized by the Igbos. By examining the national character of the Igbos, and the stereotypes that grew around them, he carefully shows us the historical process in which the Igbos became the national scapegoat, and one section of the country practiced what he calls “transferred malice,” where the Igbos were singled out for punishment in troubles in which they may have only played a bit part. Mr. Siollun demonstrates that there is a very strong case for seeing January 15 as an UPGA (United Progressive Grand Alliance) coup, or in other words, a second attempt by the South or southern political parties to wrest power from the North.

In this absorbing and fascinating work, there is a good deal of new and startling information: this includes brief character and biographical sketches of principal players that inject life into the narrative, and make the historical protagonists more than just names on a paper. Who knew that in private moments, the genial Ironsi liked to refer jokingly to his fellow Igbos by the pejorative Northern term “Nyamiri?” We learn of the enormous family pressures on Northern officers and men after January 15 demanding vengeance for the Northern officers killed. The blood relationships between some of the July 1966 plotters are revealed. We begin to understand Ibrahim Babangida better when we know he was involved in virtually all coups after 1966, and that his closest friends were among the Dimka coup plotters of Feb 1976, a coup in which he was marked for liquidation. We learn that Gen. Obasanjo wept when the poisonous chalice of leadership would not pass him by.

The book of course has its flaws, some quite minor and perhaps fixable in later editions. The footnoting seems somewhat haphazard and sparse. To some, this may be considered a benefit, but it could be frustrating to the reader or researcher who wants to learn more by exploring sources. And one of the more vexatious things is that the footnoting, like Carlyle’s History, “is silent where you most wish her to speak.”

More egregious are the omissions and failures to explore some controversial areas. We do not know the extent of Fajuyi’s involvement in January 15 even though Mr. Siollun was involved a few years back in a debate about it with someone on the Web who went by the moniker “Arthur Unegbe”. Perhaps there is nothing to know or find out, but Mr. Siollun’s silence—no discussion of rumours, or analysis of possibilities—is troubling. Also could there not have been a brief exploration of the contradictions in the public statements of Gowon’s apologists and the actions of the man that suggest some foreknowledge at least of the July horrors? However, in light of the importance and intelligence of this work, it would be churlish to carp about these matters.

I admit to being skeptical before reading this work, expecting the typical tendentious and ethnically jaundiced approach that colours most Nigerian commentaries on the coups of 1966. What Mr. Siollun has given us rather is a deft, measured, and just examination of those tragic events, all done in very accessible prose. All Nigerians owe him a debt of gratitude.