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For the past eighteen years President Derby has been uninspiringly ruling over a desert poor coun...Read the full article.

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Mr. Okenwa's aricle is a good contrubution to the research on Chad and the Dangers of a Third Term. Below is a study I did at the beginning of 2007 whjch might add a little to the background to Chad.

It is not possible to understand the current dilemmas in Chad without understanding the complex ethnic structure of the country. For centuries the people of what is now Chad were a tribal, nomadic people, herding cows and engaging in subsistence agriculture. Chad is a very culturally diverse nation. Among the characteristics of this diversity is the extremely large number of languages spoken there. Although the only official languages in Chad are Arabic and French, there are also more than 100 tribal languages spoken and a dialect of Arabic known as Chadian Arabic is the closest thing the country has to a national trade language. The largest ethnic group in Chad, the Christian/animist Sara peoples living in the south, only make up 20% of the population. The Sara people are the largest ethnic group in Chad and include the Ngambaye, Mbaye, and Goulaye. They are Christian/animist and reside mostly in the far south of the country. The Sara were seriously affected by many centuries of Arab slavery. It was this threat that led to Sara women wearing lip-plates in order to make themselves less attractive to slavers. Later, during French rule, many Sara were forced to help build the Congo-Ocean railway. The French also forced the Sara to grow cotton in order to pay taxes. Many Sara, however, benefited from French education and they now occupy most civil service positions in Chad, as well as many mid-level positions in the military.

The people of central Chad are mostly nomadic and pastoralist. The mountainous north has a sparse, mostly Muslim population of mixed backgrounds. The country is split between Muslim and non-Muslim tribal groupings. Muslim groups include Arab peoples, Maba, Toubou, Fulbe, Baguirmi, Kanembou, Zaghawa and Hadjerai. Non-Muslim groups include the Massa, Sara, Mbaye and Goulaye The divisions are not only by language. There are ‘African’ Chadians and ‘Arab’ Chadians. The conflict between African and Arab (which has characterised the war across the border in Sudan), is mirrored in the ethnic and political strife in Chad.

The President, Deby, is an African Zaghawa. The Zaghawa are an ancient society that dates back to the seventh century. During that time, they had their own kingdom ruled by chieftains and divided into strict social classes and family clans. The various clusters of Zaghawa tribes are still divided into clans, yet the development of the nations of Sudan, Chad and Niger has weakened the chiefs and the overall Zaghawa social system. The adoption of Islam, which was introduced into the region in the 1600s, contributed to the weakening of the Zaghawa clan system. Although Islam is widely accepted and the study of Islamic law is highly respected, the Zaghawa still hang on to many of their traditional superstitions. To avoid the curse of the “evil eye,” a rather vague yet terrifying phenomenon, they wear charms, construct their houses in a certain fashion and cover their babies’ faces in public.

The Zaghawa are scattered throughout the African countries of Sudan, Chad and Niger. Also called the Beri, the Chadian-Sudanese Zaghawa are a semi-nomadic tribe that is found living primarily along the border between Sudan and Chad. Numbering approximately 171,000, they are a camel and cattle herding group who also engage in a fair amount of agriculture. According to the last Chadian census in 1993, of the 16 ethnic groups that straddle the border, 78,000 Zaghawa, 50,000 Masalit and over 760,000 members of nomadic Arab tribes live in Chad. The Sudanese counterparts of all these groups are prime movers in the Darfur conflict; especially the Fur (for whom ‘Darfur’ –home of the Fur) is named. The groups share common resources, history, culture, family ties, and remain close. In Tine, just a dry river bed separates the Chadian and Sudanese Zaghawa, allowing them to share both water points and marriage ties.

In Chad, as in many neighbouring countries, one’s tribe, ethnic origin and language are determining features of one’s life, career opportunities and survival. The ethnic element in the internal dissent in Chad and in the spill over of the Sudanese War against African Sudanese tribes and, especially Darfur, is one of the most crucial elements of the situation.

II. Politics in Chad

Throughout its 45 years of independence, Chad has been racked by civil wars, which were the most violent peaks of a persistent cycle of instability in which strongman rulers were replaced by former allies who had become disaffected and organized armed rebellions. In the country's most troubled period -- between 1975 and 1990 -- the endemic conflicts were exacerbated by the intervention of foreign powers, as Libya occupied the northern part of Chad -- ostensibly to back one of the factions -- and the U.S. and France supported the other with military aid.

After the Western favourite Habre ousted the Libyans from Chad in 1987, Tripoli soon found another player to back in Deby, who had gone into exile in Sudan in 1989 when Habre accused him of plotting a coup. Deby's successful insurgency ushered in a period of relative stability, including multi-party elections in 1996 and 2001, the latter of which was marred by irregularities.

Despite this development of constitutional rule and the increased tolerance of political opposition, the familiar pattern of disaffection leading to armed rebellion reasserted itself in 1998, when Deby's former defence minister, Youssouf Togoimi, initiated an insurgency that a peace deal brokered by Tripoli muted but failed to quell altogether. The most recent wave of defections in 2005 simply repeats the entrenched pattern.

Chad's troubled post-independence history is an extreme case of the problems faced by many post-colonial African states in their attempts to achieve political integration. Formerly part of French Equatorial Africa, Chad's territory was not demarcated with concern for social, cultural and economic coherence, and followed the colonial power's convenience and preference for straight lines. Like its neighbour Sudan, Chad is split between an Arab-Muslim north and a Christian and animist south, and contains more than 200 distinct ethnic groups, many of which are split into sub-societies with distinctive cultures. The fragmentation of Chad's society and the rivalries that it has created both within and between regions are the root causes of the country's failure to achieve political integration and has engendered the ‘personalism’ that characterises its political class. The lack of a coherent societal community has left Chad open to corruption -- it shares last place with Bangladesh on Transparency International's corruption index -- which has propelled political defections through fights over spoils and consequent jealousies.

Arid, landlocked and lacking basic physical and social infrastructure, Chad is one of the five poorest countries in the world, with 80 percent of its population of 9.5 million gaining its livelihood from subsistence farming and stock raising. However, the country's economic prospects improved and it gained strategic importance in the late 1990s when its oil fields in the southern Doba region -- estimated to contain one billion barrels -- were developed by an international consortium including ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco and Malaysia's Petronas. Petroleum exports began in 2003, after a pipeline through Cameroon was completed with a capacity of 225,000 barrels per day. As a result of the new oil revenues, Chad's G.D.P. increased by 40 percent in 2004 and by a further 48% in 2005.

There are many important problems confronting Deby; these derive primarily from the instability of the ethnic nature of the society and the direct intervention of Sudan in cross-border raids by the ‘Janjiweed’ (cavaliers). The underlying society is too divergent to crystallize into a coherent political community, leaving the way open to cronyism. The habit of Chadian political actors is to represent narrow group interests at the expense of broader social interests.

Chad was a former province of French Equatorial Africa; Chad achieved its independence from France in 1960. Idriss Deby assumed state control in 1990. In April 1993, a National Conference, composed of Deby's political party and members of several opposition political groups, created a transitional government, with Deby remaining as head of state. They adopted a transitional charter, and formulated a timetable for national elections. A new constitution was adopted by a national referendum in March 1996. The constitution called for the establishment of a bicameral legislature (National Assembly) and the election of the president by direct universal suffrage.

The president was allowed to serve a maximum of two five-year terms in office. Conflict began in 1998 when the Mouvement pour la Democratie et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT) began to protest Deby's government, though fighting was confined to the Tibesti region in the north. Deby was elected to his second term as president in 2001. In January 2002, the Chadian government and the MDJT signed a peace agreement calling for a cease-fire and giving amnesty to the rebel fighters.

The first open conflict from abroad occurred in 2004 when a heavily armed column of Algeria's Groupe Salafiste de Prédication et de Combat (GSPC), turned up unexpectedly in the Wour region of the Tibesti. Led by Amari Saïfi, known as Abdelrazak 'Le Para' due to his background as a master sergeant in the Algerian special forces, it was engaged * equally improbably * by regular units of the Armée Nationale Tchadienne (ANT), which previously had been incapable of dealing with the rather less fearsome Mouvement pour la Justice et la Démocratie au Tchad (MDJT).

Seeking to make its own political capital from the incident, N'djamena said the Algerian Islamists had wanted to link up with the MDJT, a claim vigorously denied by the opposition movement. The 8-9 March battle killed a reported 43 of Le Para's men: he himself is said to have escaped back to the Algerian Sahara and is keeping a distinctly low profile. But the incident is served to push Chad higher up the United States' agenda, and US military cooperation has moved to draw Déby closer into Washington's sphere of influence.

Le Para, the self-declared GSPC number two, had been roaming the Malian Adrar since late 2003 when the German government paid a ransom of Euro 4.6 million ($5.5 million.) for the last of 32 mostly German tourists kidnapped in southern Algeria in June. At the end of February he was chased over the border into Niger by the Malian army, which was being trained by operatives from the 1st /10th Special Forces Group, part of the United States European Command (EUCOM).

The training formed part of the four-country Pan Sahel Initiative, which aims to bolster Sahelian armed forces' counter-insurgency capacity, and has also brought US Rangers to Niger, though both the Malians and the Americans have denied any US involvement in operations against Le Para. US trainers arrived in Chad in July 2004, bringing with them new non-lethal field, transport and communications equipment for the national army.

This initiative involved around 200 men from the US army's 10th Special Forces Group who were installed in Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Niger to train their armies in anti-terrorism tactics and to improve coordination with the US military. Military cooperation with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia - where many suspected violent Islamists detained in Europe over the past two years come from

Le Para was tracked to Wour by a US P3 Orion spy plane, which transmitted detailed information to ANT units. On the ground, coordination was controlled by US Special Forces (based in Mali). Whatever their role in the Tibesti, there is little the US can do to counter the threat to Déby from the conflict in Sudan's Darfur province.

Deby’s position continued to be weakened by defections and the formation of new political groupings. The announcement in March 2004 of the formation of yet another anti-Déby politico-military umbrella group, the Union des Forces pour le Changement, was viewed locally as merely a further vehicle for veteran exiled politician Acheikh Ibn Oumar of the now defunct Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire. The MDJT is also a member, along with four smaller movements: Dr Nahor Ngwara Mamouth's Front Démocratique Populaire, the long-established but deeply divided Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Développement, the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale and the rump of the Mouvement pour l'Unité et la République. But little is expected of the new movement. Dissidents within the MPS and the anti-Déby Zaghawa expect any genuine threat to the President to come from within the army, rather from the south or the remains of the Toubou and Gorane groupings loyal to ex-President Hissène Habré (now facing extradition from Senegal).

France played a vital supporting role in Déby's 1990 campaign to take power and despite some diplomatic ups and downs since then, has come to his aid again. French troops of Opération Epervier are permanently based in Chad and within hours of the United Nations Security Council voting Resolution 1556 on Darfur on 30 July, 2004, France had ordered military aircraft to help deliver aid and 200 troops to patrol the border. They are supporting the African Union observer mission but with the clearly stated aim of backing Colonel Déby and preventing further instability

Despite this, there were additional defections from Deby’s coalition. In October 2005, a group of dissident military officers, soldiers and government officials formed the Platform for Change, National Unity and Democracy, and based themselves on Chad's border with Sudan's Darfur region with the aim of overthrowing Deby. A second wave of defections occurred in 16-17 May 2005 that included two of Deby's nephews -- Tom and Timane Erdimi -- who had managed Chad's vital oil and cotton sectors. The new group of dissidents formed their own movement that also aimed at Deby's ouster. The authorities claimed to have put down a coup plot, while Déby was in Mali for a meeting of the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (Censad). Several senior Zaghawa were replaced, including the brothers Tom and Timane Erdimi, respectively Déby's oil advisor and the head of the state cotton company, Cotontchad. The armed forces Chief of Staff, General Hassan Djorbo, was replaced by Gen. Mahamat Saleh Kaya, and the head of the state intelligence agency, the Agence Nationale de Sécurité, Mahamat Hanon, was replaced by a member of Déby's inner circle, Mahamat Ismail Chaibo.

The official version of events is that it was an uprising by troops angry at attempts to clean up army finances and halt the practice of claiming salaries for non-existent soldiers after a purge begun in February. Yet the high rank of many of those arrested suggested a political dimension. The Zaghawa Kobé, cousins of the Sudanese Zaghawa Tuer, make up most of the Presidential Guard and expect their turn for power after the passing of Déby, a Bideyat from Am Djeres whose mother was a Zaghawa from Tiné in eastern Chad. Clan rivalries between Zaghawa, Gorane and 'Arab' elements in the ruling elite have been a permanent feature of Déby's presidency but the Darfur fighting could deepen the Zaghawa-Arab tensions and bring matters to a head.

Additional cabinet changes on 24 July suggested that Déby was trying to keep real power and influence in the hands of himself and Prime Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat, a minor Déby clan member and the younger brother of presidential doctor Hassane Mahamat Hassane. The reshuffle saw the creation of a Ministry of State Control and Ethics, a gesture to donors closely monitoring the use of oil revenues.

At least eight separate resistance groups were operating in eastern Chad in December 2005, as local defections began to mount. The situation reached a boiling point on December 18, when insurgents attacked the town of Adre and 300 people -- most of them reportedly insurgents -- died in fire fights between the rebels and government security forces. A shadowy group called the Rally for Democracy and Liberty took responsibility for the attack.

By January 6, 2006, Radio France International (R.F.I.) reported that eight resistance groups were organizing to form a United Front for Democratic Change and were holding discussions on the composition of a transitional government that would assume power after Deby's removal from office. The R.F.I. report noted that the discussions were "painstaking," reflecting the difficulties that the resistance groups were encountering in reaching an accord.

The Adre raid precipitated Deby's December 24, 2005 declaration of a state of belligerency with Sudan, which he accused of supporting the rebels. Tensions between N'djamena and Khartoum had been building throughout 2005. In April 2005, N'djamena accused Khartoum of arming and training 3,000 Chadian insurgents, and in October N'djamena closed its consulate in Darfur and asked Khartoum to close its consulate in eastern Chad. Khartoum responded by charging N'djamena with supporting anti-government rebels in Darfur and with failing to police its borders.

Through late 2005 and into 2006, each side accused the other of supporting cross-border raids, as both beefed up their military presence in the region. On January 5, 2006, the U.N. Mission in Sudan reduced its presence on the Sudanese side of the border to "essential life-saving humanitarian services," citing "a build-up of forces on either side of the Sudan-Chad border with increased potential for armed conflict." Facing a growing armed opposition and increasing tensions with its larger neighbour, Deby initiated a mini-summit of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (C.E.M.A.C.) in order to gain diplomatic support. The five other C.E.M.A.C. members -- Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon -- issued a statement condemning "any attempt to destabilize Chad and its democratic institutions," and lending their support to "the Republic of Chad and its president Idriss Deby." C.E.M.A.C. did not, however, censure Sudan by name as Deby had desired, nor did it yield to his wish that the organization demand that Khartoum be replaced as the site of forthcoming meetings of the African Union and be denied the rotating presidency of the Union.

The Darfur conflict has highlighted tensions within the Bilia and other Zaghawa political and military networks. In particular, army units under influential Bilia sub clan leaders have been increasingly working under their own initiative. Many lineages have personal stakes in the conflict and these have badly reduced Déby's room for manoeuvre, and the ailing President has twice purged the army general staff since February amid rumours of a coup.

Idriss Déby's ruling Mouvement Patriotique de Salut (MPS) is also now split along factional lines, both over Darfur and over Déby's success in modifying the constitution to allow him to run in 2006 for a third term as president.

Anti-Déby party members, now largely marginalised by a series of cabinet shuffles, have been debating whether to group around the former Chadian ambassador to the US, Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane. The author of an open letter to Déby in December, criticising the increased personalisation of his rule * and by implication the growing influence of Déby's brother Daoussa. Soubiane has been intermittently in hiding since being dismissed by the President in February. Some senior MPS barons are said to be quietly transferring their assets abroad. Southern federalist Yorongar Ngarléjy repeats that he would win a legitimate poll in 2006, but is equally confident that there won't be one. He is still recovering from torture inflicted several years ago by Déby's security agents.

Eight rebel groups opposed to Chadian President Idriss Deby formed another alliance in December 2005. The alliance, the United Front for Democratic Change, has agreed to share manpower and weapons in an effort to topple Deby. Abdullahi Abdel Karim, spokesman for alliance member Rally for Democracy and Liberty (RDL), said the alliance will be led by the RDL's Capt. Mahamat Nour. Karim said the alliance was formed at a Dec. 26-28 meeting.

The Chad government announced on February 24, 2006 that it had set the 3rd of May for presidential elections, bucking a repeated call by opposition leaders to hold a pre-poll national forum on the electoral process and a host of other political and fiscal problems gripping the country.

Some opposition leaders are already saying they will have nothing to do with the poll, in which President Idriss Deby is able to run for a third term thanks to a controversial amendment to the constitution passed last year. With officials beginning to spread across the country to set up electoral offices, the election season gets underway during tense days in Chad, as soldiers and military officers continue to desert their posts and talk about putting Deby out of office by means other than the ballot box.

Members of the opposition have been asking the government to postpone the poll, saying there are broad concerns about the make-up of the electoral commission and the overall process. For months they have been calling for a national forum to address these concerns and many others. The poll will go on and Deby is in desperate need of cash.

III. Conflict With The World Bank

The primary problem facing Deby is raising cash. He needs to pay civil service salaries (as emphasised in a recent strike); he must pay the military; but most of all he must pay vast sums to the tribal leaders who constitute his coalition. Now that he has announced the coming election on May 3rd he has to pay for the loyalty of his constituents. His only real source of cash is to attach the oil revenues that are being earned by the country; but these are already earmarked for social programs.

The oil industry is the only industry which generates the kind of revenue which will allow Deby to succeed and function. However, the agreement of the Word Bank to finance the construction of the oil pipeline through Cameroon to the sea was made contingent on the Government of Chad allocating a substantial part of the oil revenues towards social projects.

This is, no doubt a worthy objective and a step towards the transparency needed to assist the poorest of the Chadians but it is politically and practically naïve.

Chad's government has been facing a severe crisis. Civil servants went on strike for weeks when their salaries were not paid for several months, and retired people have not received their benefits since 2004. The crisis in Darfur, the region of neighbouring Sudan that borders Chad, has also put enormous pressure on Chad, which is now host to 200,000 Sudanese refugees. Complicating matters, Chad and Sudan have accused each other of supporting rebels on each other's soil.

Chad has demanded that the consortium led by Exxon Mobil that built the pipeline begin depositing the oil royalties directly in the country's central bank rather than an account designated in its agreement with the World Bank. Chadian officials said they were prepared to "close the faucets" of the oil pipeline if no settlement was reached. Exxon, stuck in the middle has repeated that it hoped that the bank and Chad could address Chad's financial distress while preserving the poverty-reduction framework.

The Exxon-led consortium was willing to build the 665-mile pipeline from landlocked Chad to the sea only with the World Bank's backing. With Chad's history of civil war, ethnic strife and corruption, its oil lay untapped for decades because no one was willing to put capital at risk. In 2000, the bank approved the project and lent Chad $37 million for its stake in the pipeline, while its finance agency lent the companies building the pipeline $100 million. Their support was conditioned on Chad's commitment to adopting a law requiring that most of the oil revenue go to poverty alleviation. The royalties were to be deposited in an offshore account, and an independent oversight committee was to vet, approve and monitor all spending.

But once the oil revenues began to flow into the government's coffers in 2004, the model program quickly ran into trouble. In the last year there have been over 22,000 refugees from the Central African Republic who have come for asylum among their tribal brothers in Chad. Each month brings another 2,000-3,000 refugees. There are almost 250,000 more refugees who have been driven from the Sudan to seek refuge in Chad. Despite international assistance, these refugees must be fed and sheltered; the army and civil service must be paid; and the needs of a political campaign catered to. The budget of Chad would not permit this as it stands. The World Bank was adamant – a deal was a deal and they would hold Chad to it. Deby refused and, on December 29, 2005 passed a law which rescinded some of the budget constraints imposed by the World Bank.

Accordingly, the World Bank announced on January 6, 2006 that it would withhold US$124 million of loans and development grants to the government in N'djamena in the wake of the decision by Chad's parliament on December 29, 2005 to break an agreement with the Bank on the allocation of oil revenues. This has put even more pressure on Deby as he has an additional $124 million shortfall to deal with in addition to his military and political problems.

IV . The Oil Industry

Petroleum exploration in Chad began in the early 1970's, although exploration activities were suspended in 1979 due to the outbreak of civil war. A proposed plan to build a pipeline from the Lake Chad basin fields to a new refinery in the capital of N'Djamena was also put on hold. Major oil companies in Chad include ExxonMobil, TotalFina Elf, Shell, and ChevronTexaco.

In November 1996, a consortium consisting of Exxon (now ExxonMobil; 40% and operator), Shell (40%) and Elf Aquitaine (20%), signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the government of Chad. The MOU provided the terms of the development of the Doba basin fields, and the construction of a 1,050- kilometer (650-mile) export pipeline through Cameroon to offshore export facilities located near Kribi. In April 2000, Chevron (now ChevronTexaco) and Malaysia's Petronas joined the consortium, replacing TotalFina Elf and Shell, who had divested their combined 60% share in the consortium. Petronas acquired a 35% interest, with Chevron taking the remaining 25%. Exxon retained its controlling 40% share in the consortium.

The Doba basin's three fields (Bolobo, Kome and Miandoun) are expected to produce 900 million - 1 billion barrels of low sulphur oil over the life of the project. The consortium plans to drill 300 wells. Production is forecast to continue for 25-30 years, with peak production projected at 225,000 to 250,000 barrels per day (bbl/d). Crude oil from the three fields are gathered, treated and blended at a facility located on the Kome field. Production began a year early in 2003

Construction of the pipeline and export facilities lasted under two years. The Chadian portion of the pipeline, approximately 170-kilometers (105 miles) long, and the first (located at Kome) of the three pumping stations were built by the Tchad Oil Transport Company (TOTCO), which will also retained ownership. TOTCO, which was established in July 1998, is composed of members of the consortium and the government of Chad. The foreign consortium's share in bankrolling the Chad-Cameroon project amounted to $2.2 billion (59.2% of total costs), while commercial banks and export credit agencies contributed $600 million (16.1%) and capital markets financed $400 million (10.7%). The lynchpin of the project financing, however, was the World Bank loan of $93 million -- $53.4 million for Cameroon and $39.5 million for Chad -- agreed to in June 2000. In addition, the International Finance Corporation lent the three companies $100 million and made another $300 million available through commercial banks. Finally, the European Investment Bank contributed $40 million to the project. A week after the World Bank's board "overwhelmingly" approved the project; the U.S. Export-Import Bank approved a $300 million loan guarantee to finance exports to build the pipeline.

Chad’s Doba basin consists of three major fields: Bolobo, Komé and Miandoun. A consortium led by ExxonMobil began test drilling in the Doba basin in 2001. In October 2003, the first oil from Doba basin arrived at the port of Kribi. In December 2004, new oil and gas exploration permits were awarded by the Chadian government to Canada’s Energem Petroleum Corporation. The permits are for the Chari-Ouest basin, located near the Doba basin and Largeau basin, located in central and northern Chad, respectively. The Energem permits have been moved over to First African Oil (an Energem holding owned 51% by Energem) in February 2006. This was moved because Tony Texeira (head of Energem) is in a cash squeeze because his Middle Eastern partner has not paid in the money he promised. Texeira has been trying to raise US$23 million in the US but, according to his lawyer, it has not yet materialised. Energem’s main partner is PetroChina (a large PRC Chinese oil company) which is using Energem to gain a foothold in Chad.

President Idriss Déby won the campaign for his referendum on changing the constitution to give him a third term in office by distributing many gifts. Many of the gifts he generously distributed - a new road here, a water tower there - were financed by aid from Taiwan. A diplomatic row is looming as companies from mainland China discreetly are gaining a foothold in the oil industry through Energem. Energem, which took a huge block in central Chad and a smaller area relinquished by ExxonMobil, has a strategic alliance with PetroChina. Canada's EnCana is also working quietly with Chinese oil interests (Sinopec). Further interest in the region's potential is likely to be sparked by an oil find just over the border in Niger, by Malaysia's Petronas.

map3Another factor in Deby’s dilemma is the conflict in Darfur and the role of oil in that conflict. There are many oil concessions already awarded in Sudan, but the principal players are the Chinese and Petronas who are currently delivering oil to the external pipeline. However, with the notional outbreak of peace signed by the late John Garang, the civil war has come to a close. Many of those with leases are preparing to start opening drilling on their sites. Total, for instance, has huge blocks in Zone 5 on which it has been paying a maintenance fee of US$1.25 million each year without a return. Total is very keen on taking the steps needed for commencing on commercial production of Sudanese oil. To that end, it has been actively courting the Sudanese Government.

The most important factor in the conflict in the Sudan is that in Block 12 (Northern Darfur) the oil concession is held by Hassan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front (NIF); the ultra-Islamist political an spiritual sect. When Gen. Jafa'ar Numeiri took power in a coup in 1969, Turabi's Islamist party was dissolved and its members arrested, only to return to political life in 1977 in reconciliation with Numeiri, whose attorney general Turabi became. Numeiri made shari'a the law of the land in Sudan in September 1983, but shari’a amputations and hangings contributed to a popular nonviolent overthrow of Numeiri in 1985, and the reinstatement of parliamentary rule. In the 1986 elections, Turabi led a new faction of the Muslim Brotherhood, the National Islamic Front (NIF), to third place in the national assembly.

The NIF sought to create an Islamic state in Sudan. In 1989, from behind the scenes, this party participated in a military coup overthrowing the elected government. From that time until 2001, Turabi was the power behind the throne, whether as leader of the NIF or later as speaker of the assembly. He led the creation of the NIF police state and associated NIF militias to consolidate Islamist power and prevent a popular uprising. The NIF police state and militias committed many human rights abuses, including summary executions, torture, ill treatment, arbitrary detentions, denial of freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion, and violations of the rules of war, particularly in the south, where a civil war was being waged from 1983 to the present. In 1990-91 Turabi also established a regional umbrella for political Islamist militants, the Popular Arab Islamic conference (PAIC), headquartered in Khartoum. Under his guidance, the Sudan government created an open-door policy for Arabs, including Turabi's Islamist associate Osama bin Laden, who made his base in Sudan in 1990-1996.

After a period of political isolation, Turabi has reasserted his power in the Sudanese Government. He was promised the concession for all the oil in Zone 12. With financial support from the UAE, Yemen and Al Qaida he hopes to drive out the Africans living in that zone to allow him to exploit the oil concessions. The janjiweed are successors to the NIF militias and are as brutal as they. This is why the Beshir Government says, in apparent good faith, that it doesn’t control the bloodshed in Darfur, nor the janjiweed militias. These are run by Turabi and his fellow fundamentalists. In recent conversations with Turabi’s representatives, they stated that neither the UN nor the AU will have much effect on their efforts to clear the area of Africans; still less will the Sudanese Government force them to change.

V . Deby’s Position

Deby is in an invidious position. He is beset by internal enemies. Despite his victory in the May election. Deby is getting old and has been ill for at least six years. He goes to France periodically for extensive medical treatment. For years his brother was ambassador to Paris and could arrange this. He has recently returned from a four-week stay.

He cannot muster the loyalty of all the Zarghawa, and has no trust in the military. Many of his key generals have defected to the opposition or established themselves with their own militias in Darfur.

Despite receiving money from Dubai and Taiwan he cannot pay off the obligations he has assumed in agreeing to an early election. The World Bank has not just cut of his aid; it has clouded the picture for the oil companies (viz. EXXON) in making payments to the Treasury. He and his brother are viewed as personally corrupt in their downstream and supply contracts with the oil companies; particularly since they haven’t shared this wealth more broadly.

The civil servants have won their strike but there is no guarantee that the agreement will be funded in full. The retirees have not received pensions for sixteen months. Refugees swarm across Chad’s southern and eastern borders, creating ever greater demands on Chad’s resources. There is a massive and extensive drought which has made subsistence agriculture a dim memory. Sahelisation is claiming thousand of new acres every year and irrigation schemes are faltering due to lack of maintenance and spare parts.

The former leader, Hissane Habre, erstwhile friend of the French and the US is in the process of being extradited to answer charges of genocide. Hissène Habré ruled Chad from 1982 until 1990, when he was deposed by Déby and fled to Senegal. His one-party regime was marked by widespread atrocities. Habré periodically targeted various ethnic groups, killing and arresting group members en masse when he believed that their leaders posed a threat to his regime. Files of Habré’s political police, the DDS (Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité), discovered by Human Rights Watch in 2001, revealed the names of 1,208 persons who died in detention. A total of 12,321 victims of different abuses were mentioned. In these files alone, Habré received 1,265 direct communications from the DDS about the status of 898 detainees.

In February 2000, a Senegalese court charged Habré with torture and crimes against humanity and placed him under house arrest. But in March 2001, Senegal’s highest court said that Habré could not stand trial in Senegal for crimes allegedly committed elsewhere. A four-year investigation by a Belgian judge resulted in an international arrest warrant against Habré on September 19, 2005 and his arrest in Senegal on November 15. He is awaiting a decision on where he will be tried.

Most diplomats in the capital actively speculate on what will happen to Deby and when it will happen Diplomats are wondering how long President Idriss Déby will last and whether they can maintain their influence. France, Déby's long-time backer, is relentlessly positive, saying recent purges show he is finally trying to reform his clan-based dictatorship. Some other observers are more sceptical. The United States has seen its influence increase with the oil development and through military training via the Pan-Sahel Initiative, now awaiting further funding to be renewed. China is positioning itself to take a much bigger stake in the oil industry, though Chad recognises Taiwan in exchange for substantial aid. A trip to Ukraine in July by Defence Minister Emmanuel Nadingar included a visit to the state arms export company.

Déby himself is caught between the overspill from the Darfur conflict and manoeuvring within the Zaghawa elite. His power base is shrinking fast. The oil business is controlled by the Déby family, not the wider clan. Cliveden Petroleum boss Friedhelm Eronat, an oil trader also active in Sudan and in Central Asia, has used his connections with them to secure three big concessions, being developed with Canada's EnCana. The new national airline, Toumaï Air Tchad, which missed out on the contract to fly oil workers between N'djamena and Komé in part because it had no planes, is owned by Mahamat Baba Abatcha, another leading Zaghawa.

The President is in fragile health and it is unlikely that any transition would be peaceful. His opponents claim he is grooming his son Brahim, a presidential advisor, as his successor, but Brahim is only about 30 and unlikely to see off rival claims to the presidency in a succession battle. After an alleged coup attempt in May, Déby reabsorbed the Garde Républicaine into the regular army. France, which has no desire to see Chad sink back into the chaos of the 1980s, describes the move as a brave reforming gesture. Other observers see it more in terms of the neutralising of a threat. In a clever move, Déby appointed Nadingar, a civilian southerner, as Defence Minister in July but in reality he has no power.

Under the constitution, if the president dies or becomes incapacitated, the president of the National Assembly takes over and organises elections. The incumbent is Nassour Guélendouksia Ouaïdou, a reliable southerner from Déby's Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS), in the potentially delicate situation of standing between the Zaghawa and the presidency. Prime Minister Moussa Faki, Déby's nephew, is ineffectual but might prove a more palatable choice for the Zaghawa powerbrokers. Opposition politicians are frustrated by the prevailing international view that Déby, for all his faults, is a force for stability but they show no sign of overcoming their mutual mistrust and jealousy to mount a joint challenge in the presidential election, though Chad's two-round system ought to permit them to unite behind the strongest candidate in the second round.

U.S. military sources say that they have a stake in Chad’s stability. They are committed to conducting additional Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs in the Pan Sahel region. These are designed to support U.S. Special Forces training requirements in overseas environments. Although JCET exercises first must satisfy Special Forces mission essential task list requirements (METL); at the same time, the exercise is a training opportunity for the host nation. JCETs have included NCO development, light infantry training, peacekeeping operations, medical operations, human rights training, humanitarian relief operations, airborne operations or leadership training in varying amounts-again based on the needs of the Special Forces and the host nation.

USEUCOM has conducted several JCETs in Africa. In an effort to enhance sub-regional cooperation and expose Special Forces to a variety of African military experiences, the 5th Special Forces Group combined JCET events within an African sub-region along a common scenario. These events, called FLINTLOCKs, are conducted by USEUCOM twice annually. The exercise scenarios can include JCET-type events described above or other operations, such as disaster management, search and rescue, multi-purpose range construction or combat lifesaver courses. The most recent were the successful operations in mid-2005. US military members arrived throughout North and West Africa to participate in exercise Flintlock 2005. Flintlock, which ran June 6-26, was a series of military exercises conducted with US theatre security cooperation partners in Africa. European and the NATO partner nations also participated, either directly or in an advisory role.

The principal purpose of this training was to ensure all nations continue developing their partnerships; further enhance their capabilities to halt the flow of illicit weapons, goods and human trafficking in the region; and prevent terrorists from establishing sanctuary in remote areas. The training took place in several countries: Algeria, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. Participants practiced a wide variety of skills to include airborne operations, small-unit tactics, security operations, land navigation, marksmanship, medical skills, human rights training and land warfare.

The Special Forces team leader for Chad reports that the Chadian participants in Flintlock 2005 are still loyal to Deby but are nervous of what might happen if there is an outbreak of violence; particularly against the Zarghawa. France maintains a diminished presence in Chad. France has scaled down its military presence in Chad in recent years, but still maintains a deployment of around 1,000 ground troops, with twenty armoured vehicles, five Mirage fighter planes, two transport aircraft and three Puma helicopters in the capital, N’Djamena. These are active in transporting Chadian troops to and from the eastern border.

To some extent the crisis in the Central African Republic, which has led to so many refugees in Chad, was partially the responsibility of the French and Deby. On March 15, 2003, in a classic neo-colonial military coup supported by the French, Idriss Deby of Chad, and Joseph Kabila of Congo and General Francois Bozize seized power in Bangui, Central African Republic (CRA), overthrowing the 10-year-old regime of Ange Patassé while he was abroad. France has never been adverse to taking direct action but, in the case of Chad, it has been more hesitant. France, whose stake in Chadian oil is virtually non-existent, is very concerned about its real stake in Sudanese oil. This has tempered French willingness to come out, guns blazing, in support of Deby.

Now, the rebels, with Sudanese support, have entered the capital