11 Mar 2007 |
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The World Is Watching Us The international community is taking more than a casual interest in Nigeria and its forthcoming elections. The news is that Nigerians, the ordinary people, the long suffering electorate are somewhat indifferent, even if they are aware of this, our leaders who seem to know are more interested in covering their own tracks and using government machinery and resources to sell propaganda to the world, and play the politics of narcissism; civil society, the location of the aggrieved members of the Nigerian society provides a counterbalance by using a broad-based international network and access to strengthen its voice and capacity and to insist on the need to address the transformation of Nigerian politics into a peculiar form of social pathology. But why should the international community be interested in our affairs? The first major reason is economic. Nigeria's vast oil and gas resource has ensured that Nigeria's stability and security are intertwined with the security interests of the United States and major European countries, and even now, China which appears to be making major inroads into Africa. Since 9/11, America in particular has shown more interest in the Gulf of Guinea as a stable source of oil and gas. It has found here an alternative to the rather problematic politics of the Persian Gulf. Nigeria provides about sixty per cent of the oil from Africa's Oil Triangle. {mosgoogle}The presence of oil multinationals in Nigeria doing business is a practical demonstration of what appears to be a convergence of interests between Nigeria and the West. There are also massive investments by these foreign economies in other aspects of the Nigerian economy. Unfortunately, Nigeria's economic significance is made more costly by years of poor governance and the incompetence of the local leadership elite. If the 2007 elections were to result in a breakdown of law and order, especially in the Niger Delta, the economic interests of these Western countries could be endangered. Already, the restiveness in the Niger Delta is bad for business. If Nigeria implodes, with its 140 million people, over 400 ethnic nationalities, and its complex religious and ethnic politics, the stability of the entire West and Central African region, will also be threatened. Imagine Darfur times 10, and Somalia on a grander scale. This can create a humanitarian crisis that will put so much strain on international resources. The collapse of Nigeria will reverse the successes that have been recorded in the last 10 years through the use of democratization to stabilise African nations and cause too much of an international embarrassment: not only will it deepen Afro-pessimism, it will fuel a brand of neo-nationalism that may target Western imperialism as a catalyst in the failure of African states. Third, if rogue elements were to come to power, as a fall-out of the April elections, they may introduce policies that will threaten the gains of the neo-liberalism of the Obasanjo years. Or worse, the country could face a long drawn out crisis of political legitimation which would be bad news for both Nigerians and outside stakeholders. The April 2007 elections are especially uncertain. Historically, Nigeria does not have a record successful of civilian to civilian transitions. The First Republic (1960 -1966) ended abruptly in a fratricidal war in part because of problems that attended the 1964 Federal elections and the failure of the Balewa government to respect the rules of democracy. In 1983, the Shehu Shagari government organized a shoddy, the NPN-or nothing, do-or-die elections which resulted in so much mayhem which made the intervention of the military inevitable. The Obasanjo government conducted elections in 2003, but that was merely a renewal of mandate by an incumbent government at the centre; now in 2007, there will be a change of personnel across party lines, on a massive scale, with about 12, 000 elective positions to be contested by over 30, 000 office seekers in 50 political parties, voting in over 100, 000 centres, and an estimated 50 million plus voters. The preparations for the elections, the politics of the electoral process, and the signals emanating from the political parties give much cause for concern. The questions being asked therefore are: will the Nigerian elections succeed? What can be done by the international community before, during the elections and after? What kind of support can be provided to both government and civil society to ensure that the process is credible and free and fair? It is to these and the underlying issues that the media, foreign policy establishments, donor agencies and think tanks in the West are now devoting much attention and resources. In the United States alone, policy organizations including the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Africa Studies Programme at Northwestern University, the Council on Foreign Relations, the US Institute of Peace, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, and the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, together, and individually, have been organising seminars and conferences on the Nigerian situation "to help inform US and international policy toward Nigeria". In England, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Chatham House and the School of Oriental and African Studies, CAPSS as well as other policy groups have been organizing discussions of the Nigerian process. Institutions in Germany, Canada and China are not left out. About ten countries in Africa are having their elections this year, but there is special international focus on Nigerian politics, preparations for the 2007 elections, the Niger Delta, and pre/post election assessments. More qualitative discussion and analysis of Nigeria's electoral process is going on in universities and policy think tanks in the West than at home here in Nigeria. Whereas there is a synergy between the intellectual establishment and the state in Western countries, which facilitates the growth of ideas and knowledge about the world, in Nigeria, there is a disconnect which promotes illiteracy, love of rumours and hatred of ideas. However, that is another matter. In the last six months, Nigerian political figures, and persons in public life (Vice President Atiku Abubakar, Professor Pat Utomi, Governor Orji Kalu, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Mallam Nasir El-Rufai, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, Dr Oby Ezekwesili, Information Minister Frank Nweke, Chief Akin Osuntokun, Chief Ojo Maduekwe) in addition to labour leaders, human rights activists, development experts, Nigerian social scientists and public opinion leaders have been regular participants at the international forums where Nigeria's future is analysed and debated by international audiences. Intelligence reviews are being written. There are African experts in these policy establishments who know Nigerian more than many Nigerians. They are not relying on diplomatic dispatches from their Embassies in Nigeria. They are gathering information about the Nigerian situation, from Nigerians, who are invited to their own capital cities. They also visit Nigeria. They know us. It must be flattering to Nigerians that their affairs have always been so important to the rest of the world. But these forums are not mere talk shops. They offer the Western policy establishment a sense of how peculiar Nigerian democracy is, its complexity and a sober awakening to the fact that the democratization agenda at the heart of the American foreign policy process for example, is not a deus ex machina, but a complex proposition determined by local realities and perceptions, its outlook varies from one country to another, from Nigeria to Algeria, to India and Indonesia. But so much information is gathered. This explains why the Obasanjo government takes these forums seriously. The more articulate members of the Obasanjo team are on permanent stand-by: they can be found wherever Nigeria is being discussed in the West. You need to see them at work. They sell Obasanjo's achievements, they offer assurances that the elections will hold as scheduled; and they never fail to advertise Atiku Abubakar to the international community as an "indicted official" who must not be allowed to contest for public office! These are Obasanjo's Alsatian dogs; they adopt "bolekaja tactics" at international forums where civility is expected, but they use their brains; their brief is to demolish any anti-Obasanjo argument as advanced by Nigerian civil rights activists, Niger Delta militants and aggrieved Nigerians in diaspora. The Nigerian government has also engaged the services of image laundering companies in Europe and America: to monitor the foreign media and intellectual establishment and help sell Obasanjo who obviously is dreaming of a career as an international statesman after leaving office. Half of the energy that is being devoted to propaganda by the Nigerian government could be more creatively used. Only desperate governments (Abacha, Babangida) pursue image laundering with the kind of mania that we are witnessing. In an age of communications technology and internet, the world has become truly flat. Telling lies and selling emotions as a strategy of international relations is self-defeating. The only caveat is the impression of ideological balance that is constructed at many of these forums. Nigerians are very good at washing their dirty linens in the marketplace. Just as the Obasanjo boys sell the government to the world, Atiku and his supporters have also done a good job of exposing Obasanjo's eight years of paternalism without fatherhood. The reduction of Nigerian politics to the jockeying of ego has thus been internationalised. The international community is therefore justifiably disturbed by the absence of an elite consensus about the future stability of Nigeria. There is reason to be worried about the manner in which Nigerian governments and public institutions, the police and other security agencies, the political parties, INEC and the EFCC behave as if they are above democracy and the law. Less than 50 days to the commencement of the elections, the threat of violence is certain, INEC is yet to print ballot papers or take delivery of enough voting machines, ballot stations have not been designated, there has been no training for the more than 100, 000 ad-hoc staff that INEC intends to recruit, the legal framework of the election is contentious as the President is yet to give assent to the Electoral Act 2006 (as amended)..There are other unresolved legal issues (the disqualification of candidates, the conflict between the Joint Tax Board and INEC over tax certificates, the right of candidates to campaign freely, the embossment of photographs on ballot papers, INEC's final list, the role of EFCC and litigations in court. There are doubts even among Nigerians on the question of whether or not the elections will hold in April; the Minister of Justice has been quoted as saying time is "too short". International observers are asking: Is there a Plan B? Will the elections be postponed and if so, what would happen? I think a Plan B as defined will create a constitutional crisis that will further overheat the polity because Section 135 of the Constitution will need to be amended before any postponement of the elections can be contemplated. Nigerians want the elections to proceed as scheduled. They are willing to accept flawed elections, rather than delayed or no elections at all. They are impatient because they want change by all means. The past eight years has not translated into what they call "the dividends of democracy": functional public infrastructure, prosperity, employment opportunities, real growth and something to hope for. Nigerians are also willing to accept a level of electoral fraud that will be unacceptable even in some African countries. Whatever is the outcome of the elections, no matter how flawed, they will accept it. Where politics is concerned, Nigerians have diminished expectations. It is this acceptance of democracy as a form of blackmail, that will provide a shield against all the doomsday scenarios about the 2007 elections. Nor do I think that the Niger Delta will pose a problem during the elections: the militants will simply find new occupation as thugs for politicians and escorts for ballot boxes. After the elections, there will be litigations, and may be some violence, but the beauty of Nigeria is the ability of the people to pull back from the brink mysteriously at the last minute, and to accept tragedy with accustomed Gnosticism. What should the international community do?: mount pressure on the Obasanjo government to proceed with the elections; provide support for groups in civil society to carry out oversight functions during and after the elections, send international monitors and observers and insist on access, deny public office holders and their families visas between now and July 2007, if they already have visas, cancel them, and post-election, help to define emergent issues, and the need for the new government to return to those basic challenges of nation-building which the Obasanjo government mishandled: constitutional review, the Niger Delta, social infrastructure and how to give the people a voice in their own democracy.
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