|
There have been a lot of intellectual and programmatic efforts to comprehend and recommend solutions to the Niger Delta situation. Suggested approaches to, and understandings of, the problem have varied from analyst to analyst. But there seems to be one constant that keeps informing many representations of the situation: the belief that the Niger Delta needs “development” and “security” and that achieving these twin goals would solve the problem of the area.
I have a somewhat different take on the issue. My emphasis is not so much on the “security” and “development” dimensions of the problem as on what I consider to be a fundamental absence in the Niger Delta: justice.
{mosgoogle}As many have argued, the problem is partly one of security and accountability; these are the most visible signs of the problem. But I would argue that these are merely symptoms of a more fundamental problem: a lack of economic justice, stemming from the unwillingness of the Nigerian government to give economic justice to the people of the Niger Delta. For me, the lack of justice trumps the security and accountability dimensions of the Niger Delta problem, and may have even produced or exacerbated the problems of lawlessness and corruption that many commentators focus on.
The problem as I see it is that the Nigerian government’s solution to the problem—setting up patronage bodies like OMPADEC and NDDC that simply award juicy contracts to a few Niger Deltans and carry out token development projects—has since been overtaken by events, and has become part of the problem. This is a solution that might have worked in the 1970s, ‘80s, and early ‘90s. The problem is that OMPADEC, the precursor to NDDC, came too late, when the disillusionment in the Niger Delta was already too high and the agitation of the Delta people had gone beyond mere “development” (the agitation was about developmental attention in the earlier period) to emphasize their desire to have some control over, or to manage, their God-bestowed oil resources. What’s more, the massive corruption in these two agencies has further discredited the “development” approach to the Niger Delta problem, strengthening the rhetoric and prescriptions of Niger Deltans who insist on a more fundamental, structural solution to the problem.
What needs to be done is to replace the “development” approach with a “justice” approach. There can no longer be peace in the Niger Delta without justice, without a fundamental rethinking of questions of resource allocation and sharing, regional fiscal autonomy, and land use. Most Niger Deltans are no longer asking for “development”; they are asking for justice, and justice for them means having a substantially bigger share of oil revenue than they do now, having some control over oil exploration in the region, and having more fiscal and political autonomy for their constituencies.
Obviously, the Land Use Act and the Inland Waterways Act have to go, for any such structural justice to be possible in the Delta. But this alone would not do.
Nigeria needs to go back to the first republic constitution, which provided for true federalism in both the fiscal and political sense. It granted regions from which resources (including non-oil export resources) were derived 50 percent of the revenue from those resources, with the federal government and the three (later four) regions sharing the other 50 percent. That constitution also provided for regional political and economic autonomy, and allowed primary political, financial, economic initiative to reside with the regions.
Starting with Ironsi’s regime, a succession of military regimes assaulted this federal constitution and its fair resource sharing and derivation provisions. Nigeria degenerated from a federation animated by regional fiscal and political autonomy to a de facto unitary system. The 50 percent derivation principle declined to about 3 percent. In the early 1990s, growing agitation in the Niger Delta and growing international concern and criticisms over the region’s environmental devastation forced the Babangida regime to increase derivation to 13 percent, which was retained in the 1999 constitution still under operation.
It must be said that ex-president Obasanjo is a major culprit in this reversal of the first republic principles of devolution of power and resources; he enacted the Land Use and Inland Waterways Acts in his first stint as Head of State. Recently, a constitutional conference that Obasanjo organized and handpicked delegates for was pressured by the same government to reject a demand by Niger Delta delegates for a modest review of the derivation percentage to 25 percent, and for a yearly increase of 5 percent until the original 50 percent is reached. The rejection of this demand, which I consider even generous and which would still have left the Feds and the non-oil producing states with a good chunk of oil money to play with, served to reinforced the alienation of the Delta people and further radicalized the restive youths of the area, who, throughout the proceedings of the conference, had to be persuaded by their leaders to accept 25 percent instead of 50 percent or even a higher percentage, which they wanted their representatives to hold out for. Alas, even 25 percent did not materialize.
For the people of the Niger Delta, their struggle is about justice and first principles. Although a genuine, corruption-free development agenda for the area will assuage some of the anger; it will not stave off the agitation for what Niger Deltans like to call “resource control.” This fact, unfortunately, is yet to be accepted by either the Nigerian government (which is peopled by politicians whose very lifestyles depend on the centrist, and de facto unitary appropriation of the oil revenue from the Niger Delta) or the international community, especially countries like the US with a direct stake in the region. But I think that the economic anxieties of Nigeria’s political class, not the disposition of the international community, is the greatest impediment to the kind of economic justice that is necessary in the Delta; doing justice there would deprive the national political elite of much of the money they are accustomed to having access to.
I agree with people who argue that the Niger Delta states already get so much money—much more than the other states do—and that governors and other regional political leaders often embezzle this money instead of investing it in development. This is obviously part of the problem, but I don’t believe it is fundamental to it. It is in fact a symptom of larger problems. The larger problems are: excessive centralization (lack of federalism) and a lack of true democracy, which stifles accountability at the federal, state, and local levels.
I have always argued that the mismanagement of the Delta’s revenue by its leaders does not invalidate the case for doing justice for the Delta’s impoverished and environmentally damaged people. This is where the federal government (and some international commentators on the problem) get it completely wrong by arguing that giving the Delta a higher percentage or granting them control over their resource (sans taxes and other payments to the center, of course) will only increase the regional corruption and compound the problem. If there is any reason for the serious constitutional changes I am suggesting, it is precisely because they will prevent the kind of corruption that regional and local leaders engage in with impunity. When regional leaders are not groomed or even elected by their people and only need the support of the “federal might” at the center to come to power, such a leadership cannot be held accountable by the people in the region. This is a recipe for disaster. Much of the lawlessness in the Delta is a direct product of the political impunity that Niger Delta politicians backed by the “federal might” enjoy; some of the gangs in the Delta were/are sponsored by these politicians.
This is why in addition to “resource control,” however defined, the Delta people are also demanding for regional and local political autonomy, so that they can hold their leaders accountable and make them use what they hope will be a much higher derivation payment in the future for the development of their area. But this kind of accountability will only be possible with a comprehensive constitutional review that politically and fiscally empowers states, regions, and the electorate, and dis-empowers the center.
All that aside, the basic principle of the Niger Delta peoples' struggle, which I totally agree with, is: give us what is ours and never mind what we do with it or what we do with (or to) our leaders who don’t use it for our benefits. It is, they argue, paternalistic and insulting of the federal government (or other Nigerians) to refuse to establish or support a more just derivation principle on the excuse that the current 13 percent is being mismanaged. And I agree.
Most Niger Deltans appreciate the problem of corruption perpetrated by their leaders, and they know that after their struggle for “resource control” and federalism is won, there will be an internal Niger Delta struggle for real democracy, transparency and accountability. In fact many Deltans are already preparing for this. They prefer this internal struggle to the current one against the mighty Nigerian government. Most of them say, and I agree, that this would be a much easier struggle to execute, especially if—and this is crucial—the resource control/derivation reform is part of a comprehensive set of constitutional amendments/restructuring that guarantees regional political autonomy, electoral integrity, and a much diminished center—in both political and financial terms.
In fact, one could argue that the Niger Delta problem persists because the center in Abuja is too big, too powerful, too much in control of everything, from resources to political/electoral outcomes. The impunity of corrupt Niger Delta politicians is derived from the power of this all-controlling center. Politicians (including Niger Delta governors) who simply get in the good graces of Abuja can literally ruin their states and walk away from the ruin without so much as a slap on the wrist.
I believe that problems are better solved when they are devolved to the regional/local level. Give the Niger Delta people what they deserve from their God-given resource and remove the predatory, near omniscient power of the Federal government from Niger Delta politics and watch the Deltans elect/appoint leaders who will put their resource to good use in solving the Delta’s problems. It won’t be magical. There may still be some leakage, some waste, but that would be negligible, no more than the normal waste that one has to make allowance for in any economic analysis. But the problems of accountability and poverty in the Delta can better be tackled at the regional and local level. After all, the federal government has failed woefully in this respect, and it is time to try a different approach at a different geopolitical level.
Several benefits will accrue from doing justice in the Niger Delta through “resource control” and/or fiscal federalism. The center (Abuja) will become less attractive politically, and electoral contests, especially federal ones, will become less violent, less do-or-die, to borrow Obasanjo’s phrase. Similarly, with less fiscal might, the center will become less powerful as a meddling, controlling, and stifling presence in regional and local politics. Finally, fiscal federalism and/or “resource control” will cure the rest of Nigeria of what economists call Dutch Disease, in layman’s terms, the curse of oil. Niger Deltans may subsequently catch this disease, but not if they learn from Nigeria’s experience with oil. Justice in the Niger Delta will wean us of our slothful dependence on oil, which has undermined innovation, exploration of other exportable resources, and good old hard work.
I believe that the foreign oil companies invested in the Niger Delta should appreciate the need for “justice” in the region and support constitutional efforts to achieve it. They should also discard the failed and outmoded “development” approach. This approach could have worked in the 1970s and ‘80s, but it won’t work now. Niger Deltans need and demand justice. I know that getting it won’t be easy, since the Nigerian government prefers the “development” model because it costs less than “resource control” would, and because “development” in Nigeria provides a fertile ground for patronage politics.
An understanding of the Niger Delta problem as a “security” and “development” challenge has become part of the problem, and is no longer an adequate representation of the issue. The problem is, more fundamentally, one of justice, regional autonomy, and true democracy. International and Nigerian stakeholders have yet to catch up to this reality. And this is troubling.
Note: this piece was originally written as a private response to a published article. The article dealt with several challenges confronting Nigeria, the Niger Delta problem being only one of them. I have made several changes to it to make it accessible to a larger audience.
|
Authors 
Posted by Robot| 30.06.2007 07:19