07 Sep 2007 |
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MID-WEEK ESSAY: Wasting Coins and Notes - A Quick Evaluation of
CBN Governor Soludo's "Bombshell"
by
Mobolaji E. Aluko, PhD
Burtonsville, MD, USA
August 16, 2007
REVISED August 21, 2007
INTRODUCTION
On August 14, 2007, Dr. Chukwuma Soludo, Governor of Nigeria's Central Bank (www.cenbank.org), introduced plans for upcoming dollarization (a portion of revenue allocations to states to be in dollars), currency re-decimalization (new Naira = 100 old naira) as well as re-denomination (some old coins and notes withdrawn; some new ones introduced), in an earthshaking speech (
http://www.cenbank.org/OUT
The suddeness of the announcement purportedly in a civilian democracy, without prior warning, without robust national debates in the federal or state Executive or Legislature chambers, or in the hallowed financial and intellectual halls of the country and beyond, is in itself very worrying, eliciting questions as to who in fact the "owners" of the country are. The announcement even seems to have taken the Presidency of Umar Musa Yar'Adua aback, forcing him to ask his Economic Management Team to get back to him on it, after a two-hour grilling of Prof. Soludo at the FEC meeting of Wednesday August 15.
The announcement also brings to mind the issue of PRIORITIZING national policy: are these moves addressing the most PRESSING problems in our nation and economy right now - security, infrastructure, employment, productivity? Much as many of us want an age-old Naira-Dollar parity to return, no one wants it done as a paper gimmick, or through some voodoo monetary policy, but rather through SOUND social, fiscal and economic policies that ensure security to life limb and property; improve infrastructure; promote industrialization; and genuinely increase both employment and productivity.
Let us look at Soludo's moves seriatim.
DOLLARIZATION
The dollarization of payments to states who complain of having to pay anywhere from 70% - 85% of their budgets on local salaries and other recurrent expenditures requires one to ask how dollarization will help them; whether the states were consulted about this new payment scheme; and whether it will not lead to state-government/bank collusions and attendant foreign currency speculations. Salting away government money in foreign lands will now even be easier - Central Bank checks on Naira-dollar exchanges before illicit transfers to offshore points will no longer be necessary or will now be more easily done.
Is that what we want?
RE-DECIMALIZATION
In 1973, Nigeria changed from the imperial "pounds-shillings-pence" system (1 pound = 20 shillings; 1 shilling = 12 pence) to the indigenous decimal "naira-kobo" currency (1 naira = 100 kobo) - or 100 naira = 10,000 kobo. The current proposal is to make new 1 naira = 100 old naira - some kind of re-decimalization, or more accurately re-normalization.
Removing two zeroes in the old currency - or shifting them around the decimal point - to get the new currency is of little moment in changing the value of the currency. It is like measuring distance in Meters rather than in Centimeters, or weight in kilograms instead of grams - it does not change the distance between Point A and Point B, or the weight of that fat person. In fact, in another sense, it is a mere re-naming of "kobo" into "naira" and "naira" into "(new) naira"! [To stem the confusion, it may actually help to change the new naira's name into eg "songhai."]
However there are psychological effects that cannot be discounted in human affairs: a person now earning N200,000 salary suddenly earning N2,000 may suffer a lowering in self-esteem within his family! Billionaires suddenly becoming multi-millionaires may not be that adverse - but millionaires will have no other descriptions but poverty to describe themselves.
When re-decimalization is coupled with re-denomination (see below), in fact there could be artificial inflation, particularly for LOW VALUE commodities which the Poor in society might be mostly saddled with. For example, a N163 commodity in the old Naira becoming N1 and 63 kobo may suddenly be charged at new N2 (or old N200) if the coins which would need to used for the new transactions are not well-accepted - as it appears to be the case with the coins currently in circulation. Consequently, the acceptability of coins for transactions is CRUCIAL for the poorer people in society if artificial inflation is not to hit them.
RE-DENOMINATION
One takes greatest exception to this re-denomination, particularly bearing in mind the recent denominations introduced by Soludo's CBN.
Yes, even though Soludo has not been CBN governor since 2000 (he became Governor in June 2004), he still has to explain why we have had to spend so much money printing new notes and minting new coins since 2000, and are considering some new expenditures on printing and minting now.
Let us go through some history of Nigeria's currency here:
What we have from the above information is that on that February 28, new coins were minted:
Coins: ½ to 25 kobo coins were withdrawn from circulation
Coins: 50 kobo, 1 and 2 naira newly minted
So as of THIS MINUTE of August 16, we have the following fact about our 11 currency pieces:
We have 8 Notes:
We have 3 Coins But now, effective August 2008, according to Soludo we are going to have ONLY 10 currency pieces:
Notes: 0.5, 1, 5, 10, 20 Naira
Coins: 1, 2, 5, 10, 20 kobo
See Table 1 for a tabulation of old and proposed new currencies. [Note that 11 old denominations for a largest-to-smallest-currency value ratio of 2000 is now exchange for 10 new denominations for a ratio of only 100. Note that for the USA, this ratio is 10,000, for 10 popularly-used denominations.]
Thus, what the Central Bank will have to do are as follows - provided the name "Naira" is retained for the new notes:
1. The five old notes N1000, N500, N200, N100 and N50 introduced since November 2000 will be withdrawn from circulation;
2. Two new notes 50 kobo (N0.5) and N1 will be printed and put into circulation
3. All the three present coins N2, N1 and 50 kobo introduced in February 2007 will be withdrawn from circulation;
4. Five new coins 1, 2, 5, 10 and 20 kobo will be minted and put into circulation.
In short, a minimum of 15 PROACTIVE actions will have to be carried out in this move.
Interestingly, it would first appear that ONLY the three present notes N5, N10 and N20 can be usable AS IS - provided the name "Naira" is retained - but in fact that is NOT the case since those denominations too have to be re-designed color-wise otherwise their present holders will just have their values increase 100-fold simply for holding on to them! Consequently the ENTIRE present stock of currency will have to be withdrawn, and an ENTIRE new stock introduced.
All of the above is an expensive proposition. For example foreign bank note printer De La Rue of Britain printed the then-new N1,000 notes in 2005, according to an Oct. 3 report in Newswatch Nigeria, www.newswatchngr.com. According to the report, it cost about 939 million Naira (or US$7.24 million U.S.) to print 120 million notes - or an average of roughly N8 per note. No similar estimate is available for the coins, even though back in February 2007, Soludo indicated that the measure of introducing new notes (including polymeric ones) would save the country at least 60 per cent of the cost of minting coins, and that in general the nation would enjoy a cost reduction of between 42 to 58 per cent in the amount spent on currency production. It is reported that the CBN has printed 3.6 billion pieces of notes under Soludo, including the 120 million N1000 notes, meaning that it might at least have spent N30 billion on notes along, and maybe another N20 billion on coins. [see http://www.polymernotes.org/country_pages/nga.htm ]
It is likely that the cost of printing every note will be approximately of this same charge - old N8 or new 8 kobo - meaning that it makes most economic sense only to print denominations of higher face value; that is one with positive seigniorage, i.e. the economic term for the difference between the cost of printing/minting or otherwise creating money, and its face value. The greater concern here is that the new currency reform might cost anywhere from N75 billion- N100 billion - money that could best be spent elsewhere.
CBN INDEPENDENCE DOES NOT MEAN ISOLATION AND DISCONNECTION
As to CBN Governor Prof. Soludo's latest action, one has NEVER suggested that he (or his Board) did not do his homework first on these latest moves, whether thorough or not. Rather, it appears that he did his homework SECRETLY, and SPRUNG his results ON THE NATION - as if the nation belongs to him, or is his private company.
It is NOT. Central banks ALL THE WORLD OVER typically use ONLY THREE DEVICES or INSTRUMENTS with respect to their monetary policy (that is, with respect to the control of money supply): 1. interest rate charged to banks and passed on to consumers; 2. open market operations [ie sales or purchases of government debt instruments (treasury bonds, treasury bills, treasury notes) on the open financial markets] 3. reserve requirements [i.e. the minimum percentage of their customers' total demand deposits (checking account balances) that banks are legally required to keep on hand in cash or as deposits in their accounts ]
particularly interest rate, all with the aim of achieving some economic and/or political outomes such as the control of INFLATION. Very few people object to the independence of Central Bank in setting those three levels - in fact, they are statutorily given wide latitude and autonomy in setting them - but even then one does find a LOT OF very PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS in government circles, in financial circles, in the media and in the universities before particular levels are set. That a Central Bank is INDEPENDENT or AUTONOMOUS does not mean that it is completely ISOLATED and DISCONNECTED from society. Rather, its governors/directors hear quite a lot of public arguments and bring them to bear in their final decisions. One does not say that Soludo should STRICTLY confine himself to those three instruments - for example, his money supply device also includes foreign exchange supply via the Wholesale Dutch Auction System (WDAS) which he also intends to scrap as part of the newly-announced reforms - but he had better be prepared to hear from some people if he goes beyond those three, including bank consolidation. For example, in the many years that Alan Greenspan was Fed. Reserve Chairman in the USA (August 11, 1987 – January 31, 2006) , besides tweaking interest rates and money supply every now and again, we heard that: - In 2000, a new $1 coin featuring Sacagawea was introduced; - In 2003/2004, new security watermark features were introduced in so-called NexGen notes $100, $50, and $20 notes (see http://www.moneyfactory.gov/document.cfm/10/63/1666 ) Under the new Chairman (Bernanke): - In February 2007, the US Mint under the Presidential $1 Coin Act of 2005 introduced a new $1 US Presidential dollar coin We can read a little more here in this excerpt:
We should note that in the above report, even in the US, the Federal Reserves is NOT in TOTAL CONTROL of which currency is in circulation or note; note Nixon's "executive order" of 1969 withdrawing notes above $100 from general circulation. Thus, the Feds acted in concert with the Presidency in that regard, obviously because it had both economic and political implications BEYOND the remit of the Federal Reserve.
One appreciates the youthful dynamism and vigor - coupled with intellectual antecedents - that the 47-year-old Prof. Soludo brings into the CBN governorship job, but his current re-decimalization, re-denomination and dollarization go FAR BEYOND the normal central bank decision-making, and should have executive, legislative and even popular input before the bank makes its final decision. STAR-STRUCKEDNESS AND OFFICE PERSONALIZATION
Finally, it appears that too many of us Nigerians are star-struck. Criticiquing a person's policy should not be construed as criticizing the person as criticizing his face, his figure, his clothing, his wife might be. In fact, I have read Soludo referred to as a "genius" - apparently a genius who should not be crossed or argued with. He may indeed be a genius, but at the end of the day, Prof. Soludo is an ACADEMIC like some of us, and is probably more amenable to VIGOROUS DISCUSSIONS than most of those star-struck admirers are prepared to grant to him. It is just that Nigerian "big-man-ism" and hero-worship sometimes make our people in power to forget their traditional instincts of vigorous intellectual discourse, to proceed to personalize offices so much in a manner that makes them larger than their offices, and make it appear that their offices will collapse without them.
That should not be. AND WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Four suggestions are apropos here:
1. Dollarization: If the idea is for states to have easier access to dollars, then the CBN can simply state that no more than 5% of the monthly revenue allocation will be paid directly to them IN DOLLARS to those who so request it - or preferably a BASKET OF CURRENCIES as the states may choose. For one could ask: why in dollars?
2. Re-decimalization: At this time, this move is an unnecessary distraction. There is no inherent appreciation (or even depreciation) of the Naira in these reforms, nor is a revaluation (or devaluation) by fiat through the backdoor practical. On the other hand, the approximately N127-$1 can be strengthened to N100 to N75 to N50 and even to parity (hopefully) through less corruption in our society and the right economic policies. After all, the Yen is roughly 117 Yen to $1 - and the Japanese economy is reasonably healthy. (See Appendix I for some exchange rate movement graphs for some countries.).
3. Re-denomination: This move should be avoided and might become moot if decimalization is postponed indefinitely. We should let the present currency regime remain, while promoting wider use of the coins currently issued.
4. Consultation: Most importantly, a country is defined by its name, its borders - and its currency. No single government agency should be able to toy with any one of these without extensive discussions by all "stakeholders." Consequently, we should return FULLY to discussing any future changes in our monetary policy, even if the final decision is made by the Central Bank. For example, South Korea - at a time when its won-to-dollar ration was about 1145-to-1 ANNOUNCED in September 2004 after a two-year study that it was "thinking" of decimalizing/redenomination
I rest my case for now - but the debate should continue.
Tables and figures for this essay will be found at the URL:
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