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Continued From:
Part One: http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/max-siollun/babangida-the-early-years-of-the-evil-genius-pa-2.html
Part Two: http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/max-siollun/babangida-the-life-and-times-of-the-evil-genius-part-2-coup-bai.html
Part Three: http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/max-siollun/babangida-his-life-and-times-part-3-the-return-of-the-mili.html
Part Four: http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/max-siollun/babangida-his-life-and-times-part-4.html
Over the past few months I have been chronicling the key moments in the life and times of former military president General Ibrahim Babangida. This latest segment (part 5 of the overall series) examines the controversial trial of Babangida’s boyhood friend Mamman Vatsa for allegedly plotting to overthrow Babangida.
FRIENDS FALL OUT
Babangida’s rise to power was followed the
customary purge of personnel whose loyalty could not be guaranteed. However, Babangida had not purged thoroughly
enough. In early December 1985, rumours
of a coup plot began circulating in military and political circles. With the government making no announcement on
the allegations, several names were mentioned as alleged instigators of a
coup. The rumours swept around the
barracks too and the name of Mamman Vatsa (Minister of the
Federal
Capital
Territory)
crept up. The rumours got to Vatsa's
orderly who did not know how to approach his boss about such a sensitive
issue. The orderly therefore disclosed
the rumours to Vatsa's wife, who in turn urged her husband to talk the issue
out with Babangida.
Babangida and Vatsa had been friends since
boyhood and were old classmates in school, having attended the
Bida
Middle
School together. They were also course mates from their cadet days having enlisted in the
Nigerian
Military
Training
College on the same day,
commissioned into the army on the same day and holding equal rank and seniority
to each other. In the company of two of
their mutual friends (one of whom was Gado Nasko), Vatsa met with Babangida and
asked him how he could suspect his own friend of coup plotting. According to Babangida Vatsa asked him "You heard I was planning a coup and
couldn't even ask me. What kind of friend are you?" Babangida replied
"I didn't believe it or are you planning a coup?" Vatsa replied
in the negative.
The coup rumours were so wild that even Nasko’s
name was being peddled as a suspect by rumour mongers. Babangida refused to believe Nasko was
involved and said “I don’t like to hear
this nonsense.” The matter was
forgotten until the ultra security conscious Babangida became convinced that
there was a genuine coup plot. At this
stage, Vatsa was likely to escape with his life since Babangida was unsure of
his guilt. However, Vatsa made a crucial
mistake. According to Babangida:
“While
the investigations were going on, the investigators said they wanted to take
him into Intercell (Interrogation Centre), but I insisted that Vatsa should not
be treated like others, not while I was the head of government. First he was (and still is) my friend,
secondly, he is a General. I told them
the best I could allow him was for him to be restricted to his house….then
there was an attempt to escape through the hole of an air conditioner and
that’s where we had to concede to put him in the cell.”[1]
ANOTHER COUP PLOT
On December 20, 1985 the government formally
acknowledged the issue when Maj-Gen Domkat Bali (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and Defence Secretary) announced that “officers from all the services were recruiting followers and
concluding plans for the overthrow of the government.”
Bali claimed
the plotters planned to overthrow the government because:
- They
opposed the retention of some public officers from the former regime.
- The
new regime was too concerned with human rights.
- The
drafting of middle grade officers to public office.
- The
government’s rejection of a loan from the International Monetary Fund.
Analysed objectively, the reasons stated by
Bali for the coup seem amateurish but were not disbelieved or critically
appraised by a gullible public that was still intoxicated on Babangida's charm.
If these were the real reasons, the plotters would have had immense difficulty
in convincing the public and their armed forces colleagues that these were
sufficient justifications for a violent coup. A more plausible synopsis is that the coup was the culmination of the
power struggle between the pro-Buhari and pro-Babangida factions in the army. The plotters belonged to the former faction
and might have advocated a return to the disciplinarian ethos of the Buhari regime.
This gave the government latitude to embellish the coup's rationale in
Bali's statement. However
Bali did not name the perpetrators. This led to a further round of rumours and
gossip about the potential suspects. Babangida later jocularly suggested that the only officer not to be
linked with the coup was Babangida himself.
THE SUSPECTS
On December 27, 1985 (exactly one week after
Bali’s announcement) the Information Minister Lt-Col
Anthony Ukpo named the coup suspects:
Maj-Gen Mamman Vatsa
Brigadier Malami Nassarawa
Group Captain Ita David Ikpeme
Group Captain Salaudeen Latinwo
Lt-Col Musa Bitiyong
Lt-Col Moses Effiong
Lt-Col Michael Iyorshe
Lt-Col Emmanuel Obeya
Lt-Col Christian Oche
Major Daniel Bamidele
Major D. Edwin-West
Wing Commander Ben Ekele
Wing Commander Adamu Sakaba
Squadron Leader Martin Luther
INVESTIGATIONS
Ikpeme and Latinwo were former Military
Governors. Ikpeme formerly governed Ondo
state, and Latinwo formerly governed Kwara state. Ikpeme and Latinwo were subsequently released
after interrogation and were and not tried. Nassarawa was the commandant of the army's infantry school in Jaji, and
one of the surviving northern officers that staged a mutiny in July 1966. Additionally
it was the first time that air force and navy officers were accused of coup
plotting. A Special Investigation Panel
headed by Sani Sami was tasked with investigating the coup. The panel also included police officer Alhaji
Gambo Jimeta, Group Captain Anthony Ikhazobor and the panel secretary was Lt-Col
Ajibola Kunle Togun. As a result of
these investigations over 100 other officers were arrested and
interrogated. Eventually in addition to
the 14 officers above, Lt.-Col J.O Onyeke, Captain G.I L Sese, and Lt K.G. Dakpa
were also implicated and included in the list of officers to be tried by a Special
Military Tribunal. Solidarity rallies
were held in support of Babangida. Such solidarity
rallies would become a common feature of the military regime that succeeded
him.
VATSA'S HOUSE - 32 RUMENS ROAD, IKOYI – DECEMBER 23, 1985
Shortly after midnight on December 23, 1986 a group of soldiers led by Major Usman Kalabo Bello arrived at Vatsa’s home at Rumens Street, Ikoyi, Lagos, to arrest him (Bello later became Babangida’s ADC). The arresting officers brought an arrest warrant signed by Sani Sami - the Provost Marshal of the Nigerian army. Vatsa was whisked away in a Peugeot 504, driven around in a circuitous merry-go-round in Lagos and was taken to 7 Cameron road in Ikoyi. Vatsa's family and colleagues still thought there was hope because the arrest warrant was signed by Sani Sami (an officer on good terms with Vatsa).
The first reaction of Vatsa's family was to approach his army friends and class mates from school for help. They went to the house of Chief of Army Staff Major-General Sani Abacha. However Abacha was not at home. They instead approached Gado Nasko - another senior army officer who was a school classmate of Vatsa and Babangida. Nasko promised to help, but the situation was escalating
Vatsa was visited in detention by his daughter Fatima. After two weeks, Vatsa was transferred to Ikoyi prison, and later to the Kirikiri maximum security prison. From detention the prolific writer Vatsa wrote a detention diary every day to chronicle his ordeal. When he didn't have paper he wrote on toilet rolls and handkerchiefs which were smuggled out. Investigators searched Vatsa's house thoroughly, going through his massive library and opening up his books. They were excited by the presence of two locked safes in Vatsa's house, which Vatsa's family claimed they did not have the keys to. Vatsa also claimed he did not know where the keys to the safe were. The safes were taken to the Directorate of Military Intelligence at Apapa where they were forced open by welders. The investigators were disappointed to find that only wrist watches were inside. All utilities at Vatsa's house on Rumens road were disconnected, and after a period of time under house arrest, his family were ordered to move out.
INTERROGATIONS
To be interrogated for coup plotting in Nigeria is an extremely harrowing experience. The life of the suspect is in mortal danger and any memory lapse or social acquaintance with the wrong person can result in death. The attendant risks also extend to the accused's family and friends. Interrogators frequently apply a doctrine of guilt by association and jump at any name that the accused mentions during questioning. Lt-Col Moses Effiong discovered this. Effiong was interrogated about his social habits and was asked how he spends his spare time. When he mentioned that he often played squash with Maj-Gen Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, Yar'Adua was almost arrested as an accomplice. It was only when the folly of suspecting Yar'Adua was mentioned, did the interrogators back off.
THE SPECIAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
The Treason and Other Offences (Special Military Tribunal) Decree enacted by the regime of General Obasanjo in 1976 was re-enacted almost word for word (with minor variations) as the Treason and Other Offences (Special Military Tribunal) Decree 1986. The 1976 Decree had expired by effluxion of time. The Decree empowered the government to create a Special Military Tribunal (“SMT”) to try the suspects. The Defence Minister Maj-Gen Domkat Bali inaugurated the SMT and it began trying the suspects at Dodan barracks in January 1986. The SMT was headed by Major-General Charles Ndiomu. Ndiomu was a Delta state born officer who had prior experience of military tribunals, having served as a member of the Rebel Activities Tribunal in Benin city during the Nigerian civil war. He was also chairman of the Ibadan zone Special Tribunal (Recovery of Public Property) tribunal that tried former Shagari era politicians after the military’s return to power in 1984. Other members of the SMT were:
-
Major Akin Kejawa (Judge Advocate)
-
Brigadier Yohanna Kure
-
Commodore Murtala Nyako*
-
Colonel Rufus Kupolati
-
Group Captain Tony Ikhazobor**
-
Lt-Colonel Dansogo Mohammed
-
Commissioner of Police Mamman Nassarawa
Waiting list: Colonel Ekundayo Opaleye and Lt-Colonel Musa Bukar.
* Currently the Governor of Adamawa State.
**Later became Minister of Youth and Sports.
The SMT’s proceedings were filmed. Vatsa knew Ndiomu well as a colleague, and also via a parent-school headmaster relationship. Vatsa’s 15 year old son Haruna was a student at the Nigerian Military School. Haruna’s time at the school overlapped with the time it was headed by Ndiomu. Vatsa would often see Ndiomu when he visited Haruna at the school.
THE TRIAL
The trial was filmed. Ironically the previous year, defendant Brigadier Nassarawa served as a member of one of the military tribunals that tried the overthrown Shagari era politicians on charges of corruption. Now he was in the dock. Defendant Lt-Col Bitiyong objected to the inclusion of Group Captain Ikhazobor in the SMT on the ground that Ikhazobor was a member of the Special Investigation Panel that investigated the suspects prior to trial. Bitiyong's objection was upheld and Ikhazobor was replaced by Colonel Ekundayo Opaleye. In a recent newspaper interview Brigadier Idada Ikponmwen claimed that he was to be the lead prosecutor, but that he and the other lawyers assigned to the trial were replaced a few days prior to the trial’s commencement. He claimed he was replaced by a non-lawyer who was given junior lawyers to work with him. Many of the plotters were from the elite of the officer corps in all three armed services. They were erudite and could be considered intellectual. Lt-Col Oche was a PHD candidate at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, USA, before he was recalled by the previous regime of Buhari to work in intelligence at Supreme Headquarters. Iyorshe was an articulate and outstanding officer that distinguished himself right from his early days as a cadet. He was the ADC to former Chief of Army Staff and Defence Secretary Lt-General T.Y. Danjuma. He and Bamidele held training appointments at the Command and Staff College in Jaji. Bitiyong was the army's Director of Logistics. Ekele, Ahura and Luther were members of the presidential pilots fleet and Ogwuiji was commander of the navy vessel NNS Olokun.
THE COUP DETAILS: BOMBS AND VIOLENCE
All the accused pleaded not guilty. Except Vatsa, all the defendants were represented by military lawyers. Vatsa’s request for Yohana Madaki (an army officer and lawyer) to act for him was rejected. Vatsa therefore opted to defend himself and refused to make a written statement to his interrogators. Unfortunately for him, some of the defendants were more forthcoming.
The Prosecution Case – Evidence
The prosecution alleged that the defendants held two meetings in Lagos (at the Sheraton hotel) and Makurdi, and planned to bomb Eko bridge, the Ikeja cantonment and Dodan barracks (then the official seat of the Federal Military Government) in Lagos, using cluster bombs dropped from the air force's MIG 21 and Alfa jets to destroy armoured vehicles at Ikeja cantonment. One of these air force jets was allegedly to be flown by Squadron Leader Martin Luther (who was the leader of Babangida's presidential pilots fleet).
In a statement dated December 21, 1985 Iyorshe said he met Ekele, Sakaba and others in Makurdi and allotted responsibilities for the coup. He said they “ended up by dividing areas of responsibilities to individuals such as the operations cell, the political cell, the economic cell, the propaganda cell and the logistics.” Iyorshe said that as the plotters needed financial support, he decided to contact Vatsa through Bitiyong (since Bitiyong was known to be close to Vatsa). Prior to the Sheraton hotel meeting in Lagos, Bitiyong approached Vatsa for money to develop his farmland. Bitiyong gave four separate statements between December 22, 1985 and January 13, 1986. The prosecution alleged that Vatsa gave Bitiyong 10,000 Naira as a financial contribution toward the coup. In his first statement Bitiyong denied receiving any money from Vatsa. However he changed his story in his second statement and admitted receiving 10,000 from Vatsa, of which he said he gave Iyorshe 3,000 Naira as travelling expenses. When the issue of financing came up, Bitiyong told the other plotters that he had obtained N10,000 from Vatsa. That was the first strand of evidence against Vatsa and was used by prosecutors to allege that Vatsa was the coup's sponsor. It was also alleged that Vatsa used his position as Minister of the Federal Capital Territory to offer certificates of occupancy for prime plots of land in Abuja to induce officers to join the plot. Iyorshe had applied for certificates of occupancy for years without success, but was suddenly awarded one by Vatsa.
The Case for the Defence
The defendants admitted that Effiong, Vatsa, Akwashiki and Edwin West did not attend any of the coup meetings. Effiong was roped in and arrested at the Command and Staff College in Jaji (where he was serving as directing staff). Iyorshe told interrogators that he mentioned the plot to Effiong, but that he and the other plotters conceded that Effiong did not attend any of their meetings, nor was he even invited to any meeting, and nor was he one of their co-conspirators. Effiong also denied knowing anything about the plot. So why would Effiong be arrested and tried for a coup plot he knew nothing about? According to Effiong, Iyorshe implicated him as revenge for residual bad blood between them after the two fell out over some misunderstandings. Many years later Effiong claimed that two incidents in 1983 soured his relationship with Iyorshe. Effiong’s version of events is that the first such incident occurred when he travelled to attend a course. While there a mutual British acquaintance of Iyorshe and Effiong asked Effiong for an update on Iyorshe. When Effiong replied that he did not know Iyorshe’s current whereabouts, the acquaintance wrongly interpreted this to mean that Iyorshe was no longer in service. When the incident got back to Iyorshe, he presumed Effiong was peddling disinformation about him. Effiong made matters even worse in December 1983 when there was an active and imminent coup plot to overthrow President Shagari. Effiong returned to Nigeria and telephoned Iyorshe. When Iyorshe answered and asked who was on the line, Effiong jocularly answered “NSO” (the acronym for Nigeria’s then covert intelligence agency – the National Security Organisation). At the time Iyorshe was the Brigade Major of the Brigade of Guards at Bonny Camp in Lagos. Members of Iyorshe’s unit were neck deep in the plot against Shagari and detection by the NSO could have jeopardized the plot. Iyorshe therefore did not see the funny side of Effiong’s prank. This is Effiong’s version of events.
Major Bamidele cut a forlorn figure. He found out about the plot against President Shagari and reported the issue up the chain of command to his General Officer Commanding, Maj-Gen Muhammadu Buhari. Unfortunately for, and unknown to Bamidele, Buhari was one of the conspirators. To prevent Bamidele from leaking the plot, Buhari ordered his arrest and Bamidele was detained for 2 weeks. He was not released until after the coup had been successfully executed. Once again Bamidele learned of this current coup plot. However his experience with Buhari had taught him and unforgettable lesson. This time he kept his mouth shut and did not report the plot. Nonetheless he was arrested again, this time for not reporting the plot.
As an expert air force pilot and leader of Babangida’s personal pilots, Squadron Leader Martin Luther testified that contrary to the prosecution’s claims that they intended to bomb strategic locations in Lagos, it was impossible for MIG 21 and Alfa jets to take off from Makurdi, bomb Lagos, then return to base. Vatsa denied being a party to a coup plot and pointed out that from his experience as a member of the 1976 Dimka coup board of inquiry he had “seen the intrigues that go on when people are planning coups.” He claimed he informed the authorities when he heard rumours of a coup plot (but declined to name those he informed). Vatsa admitted giving N10,000 to Bitiyong, but said it was an agricultural loan to help Bitiyong with some farming projects. Vatsa’s son Haruna still keeps a copy of the receipt for the 10,000 Naira given to Bitiyong, and later argued whether his father would be stupid enough to issue Bitiyong with a receipt for money that was to be used to finance a coup. Vatsa also said that a certificate of occupancy was promptly granted to Bitiyong because he instructed his staff to process all outstanding applications of military and police officers. He also denied the allegation made by Bitiyong, that when Babangida was the Chief of Army Staff, Vatsa had lobbied Buhari to remove Babangida from the post.
There was a moment of tragi-comedy when the tribunal chairman Maj-Gen Ndiomu made a Freudian slip and listed one of Vatsa’s interests as “pornography”. Vatsa corrected Ndiomu, pointing out that “it is photography, not pornography”.
THE VERDICT
Ndiomu was unimpressed with the defence and said that Vatsa “had long nursed grievances against the President” and that the evidence showed the “scorn and grudge Major-General Vatsa had harboured against the President since he was Chief of Army Staff.” On February 25, 1986, 17 of the defendants (including Vatsa) were found guilty of treason. According to the tribunal chairman Ndiomu, Vatsa was the mastermind behind the plot:
“The flurry of journeys, discussions, suggestions to hijack the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria while in his presidential jet, to knock out armoured vehicles at Ikeja Cantonment, the funding of these journeys or programmes, smear campaign against the President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, etc, are all tantamount to levying war jointly or in agreement against the state of Nigeria…..It is pretty clear to the tribunal that Maj-Gen Vatsa, the poet and rich author and soldier and intelligent man knew what he was doing. Not only was he financing the plot, he was masterminding it.” Ndiomu said that Vatsa’s protestations of innonence were “clearly the impulsive, psychological mechanism of a person who has something to hide”.
Both Nassarawa and Effiong were convicted of concealment of treason for knowing of the plot but not reporting it to the authorities. Effiong was convicted even though it was his word against Iyorshe's. Effiong later alleged that Iyorshe implicated him after the two fell out over a professional misunderstanding. Wing Commander Ekanem and Squadron Leader Effanga were acquitted. 24 year old Lt Odoba was sentenced to life in prison. With the sentences passed, it remained for the defendants to appeal to Ndiomu for clemency when determining their sentence.
Although guilty verdicts had been rendered, the defendants had the opportunity to make statements in mitigation prior to sentencing.
MAJOR BAMIDELE’S STATEMENT IN MITIGATION
“I heard of the 1983 coup planning, told my GOC General Buhari who detained me for two weeks in Lagos. Instead of a part on the back, I received a stab. How then do you expect me to report this one?
This trial marks the eclipse of my brilliant and unblemished career of 19 years. I fought in the civil war with the ability it pleased God to give me. If is unfortunate that I’m being convicted for something which I have had to stop on two occasions. This is not self adulation but a sincere summary of the qualities inherent in me.
It is an irony of fate that the president of the tribunal who in 1964 felt that I was good enough to take training in the U.K. is now saddled with the duty of showing me the exit from the force and the world.”
VATSA’S STATEMENT IN MITIGATION
After being found guilty, Vatsa also read a statement in mitigation. Before he started, Ndiomu warned him that his statement would be stopped if he turned the statement into a political speech.
“I gave this tribunal a précis of my CV. I do not intend to waste more time on that in this my address of mitigation, but only to refer the tribunal to take note of that submission. Now that you have come to your decision, what else do I say other than appeal to this honourable tribunal that in passing your sentence, you may bear in mind that I served this country for over 24 years as a military officer. During this period, I performed my duties with dedication, vigour and determination. I have always been loyal to my superiors and subordinates alike. I have in my humble way contributed to the upliftment of the image of our armed forces and the Nigerian army in particular, by the way I presented myself officially or otherwise, especially through my literary activities. ”
I request you to bear in mind that I have never nursed any political ambition that is not in accordance with the norms of the profession and the laws of the land. For the periods that the military has been in government, it was only in the past two years, as from December 31st 1983 that I have participated in the running of government. I have been a full time soldier all my military life. This is the path of honour I have chosen for myself.
I would request the honourable tribunal to consider that I have never nursed grudges against anyone. I have always tried to be frank with my colleagues. It is my way. It is the way of our training. You have made your decision that I am guilty. I can’t question your right to say so as a tribunal. However I shall remain my witness before your judgment, and the testimony before its justice. Before you pass your sentence on me, I will like you to keep the lessons in view still yet. This sentence shall not be my final hour. For I have God’s promise on that. God’s judgment is the last.
May I appeal to you to also take note that I am a married man with family. I have other dependants that I have the obligation of looking after. I will like to think that by the time you finish with me, my children shall be so scared of the system that they shall never come near it, for a lean liberty is better than a fat slavery.”
I have made friends for this country in the international world and for them, whatever you decide that should happen to me would have an effect on them too. Despite some obvious limitations, I still want to thank the president and members of this tribunal for their patience and understanding throughout the trial. Though each one of us is different, it is not easy to see a comrade you have been with, in some cases through the thick and the thin being skinned but that is the position we have found ourselves in.”
The other defendants made pleas for mitigation via their counsel.
SENTENCING
13 of the defendants (including Vatsa) were sentenced to death. The convicts had 7 days to appeal against their death sentences which were subject to confirmation by the governing Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). No appeal to other tribunals or courts was permitted and only the AFRC could confirm or vary the sentences.
TO BE CONTINUED
Next Part: "While watching the video of his execution, I saw him remove his watch and give to a soldier to take to his wife saying, 'Tell her to take care of my children.' I was so touched I couldn't continue watching. I turned away and that night I couldn't sleep. Vatsa was very stubborn."
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Posted by Robot| 06.08.2008 22:46