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Continued from:
Part One: Babangida: The Early Years of the "Evil Genius" (Part 1)
Part Two: Babangida The Life and Times of the "Evil Genius" (Part 2 - "Coup Baiting")
Having handed over power to a
democratic government led by President Shehu Shagari in 1979, Babangida and his
colleagues saw themselves as national governmental custodians akin to an
emergency rescue team that could be called out to depose the government anytime
the public got fed up of its policies. In control of the military and
with wealthy civilian friends to bankroll them, Babangida and his colleagues
had an excellent chance of deposing President Shagari but simply waited for the
right time. Babangida later admitted that:
We in the military waited for an
opportunity. There was the media frenzy about how bad the election was, massively
rigged, corruption, the economy gone completely bad, threat of secession by
people who felt aggrieved. There was frustration within society and it
was not unusual to hear statements like, the worst military dictatorship is
better than this democratic government. Nigerians always welcome military
intervention because we have not yet developed mentally the values and virtues
of democracy.
Babangidas good friend MKO Abiola
might not have been the only civilian collaborator. Other media outlets,
opposition politicians and the public joined in with the lacerating criticism
of Shagaris regime. The critics were wittingly or unwittingly inciting a
military comeback by Babangida and his colleagues. Babangida revealed
that:
We couldnt have done it without
collaborators in the civil society collaborators in the media, collaborators
among people who have the means. Because the means were not easily
available but we received some from people who were convinced it was the right
thing to do
.The elite who participate want recognition, maybe patronage as
time goes by (Karl Maier Midnight in Nigeria)
However the plot was leaked to the
government through pillow talk between an army officer within the plot and his
wife who was a sister-in-law to the wife of Plateau State Governor Solomon
Lar. Lar became aware of the plot to depose the government via his wife
and he passed on the news to President Shagari. According to President
Shagari, after having dinner on the night of December 31, 1983, Shagari was
approached by Captain Augustine A. Anyogo of the Brigade of Guards. The
Brigade of Guards is the army unit detailed to guard and protect the Nigerian
Head of State. In the presence of Shagaris ADC Major Ali Geidam and a
member of the National Security Organisation Ali Shittu, Anyogo informed
Shagari that he had some urgent security information for him. Anyogo told
Shagari that a couple of hours earlier, he was approached by Colonel Tunde
Ogbeha and informed of a military operation scheduled for midnight at the
State House, Abuja. Ogbeha told Anyogo to arrest President
Shagaris at midnight and detain him pending the arrival of senior officers
from Kaduna. In response to the strange order, Anyogo replied that he
would take orders only from his own commanding officer, and not from Colonel
Ogbeha (whose base was in Lagos). Shortly afterward, Anyogo briefed his
commanding officer Lt-Colonel Eboma. Eboma arranged for troops to be put
on alert and to take defensive positions on approach roads to State House, and
reinforced the guards at State House itself.

Lt-Colonel Bello Kaliel (the
commander of the Brigade of Guards in Lagos) was also contacted but
unfortunately his deputy was one of the conspirators. Kaliel was arrested
and detained. Back in Abuja, President Shagari was woken up by his
security men and informed that troops led by Brigadier Ibrahim Bako were headed
to the State House to arrest him. Shagari was evacuated from State House
in order to get him out of harms way during an anticipated gun battle between
his guards and Bakos troops. Around 2:30 a.m. on New Year's Day 1984,
armed troops moved to strategic locations, set up roadblocks and took over the
radio and television stations in Lagos. Communication lines were cut and
airports, border crossings and ports were closed. Many of the soldiers
used for the operation were Babangidas former students from his days as an
instructor at the Nigerian Defence Academy. At 7:00 a.m. normal
programming was interrupted by martial music interspersed with the following
broadcast by a hitherto unknown army officer:

I and my colleagues in the armed
forces have in the discharge of our national role as promoters and protectors
of our national interest decided to effect a change in the leadership of the
government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and form a Federal Military
Government. This task has just been completed
. Accordingly, Alhaji Shehu
Usman Shagari ceases forthwith to be the President and Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of Nigeria.
It was the monotone voice of
Brigadier Sani Abacha, the commander of the 9th mechanised brigade
in Ikeja. On the last day of 1983, the military overthrew Shagaris
regime in order to save this nation from imminent collapse.
President Shehu Shagari was overthrown only three months after being re-elected
for his second and final term of office in an election that was marred by
accusations of electoral malpractice. Scarred by the memory of the mass
bloodshed that followed the bloody military coups of 1966, the coup plotters
wisely did not harm any senior government figures. The only casualty of
the coup was Brigadier Ibrahim Bako who was killed in still unconfirmed
circumstances while trying to arrest President Shagari in Abuja. How did
Bako die? Several different accounts have been given. The author
has distilled the three accounts from the most authoritative sources:
1) General Babangidas
Account. In an interview with pointblanknews earlier this year,
Babangida gave the following account of Bakos death:
Question:
What really happened to General Bako?
Babangida: ..
.when they went to
Abuja for that operation,
.this thing happened in the night
you see, from the
experiences we had from the civil war, we found out that soldiers sometimes panic
and when they panic, there are dare consequences. So, it was in the night and
there was what you could call accidental discharge and the first reaction of
the soldiers was that they were being attacked and in situations like that, you
could shoot anyway. It happened to us I remember, during the civil war. You get
shot at in the front and the sound reverberates behind so the soldiers at the
back believes that the person shooting is right there then they forgot that
some 500 meters away are what we refer to as own troops, your own forces.
Because of no adequate training, a soldier would just cork his riffle and start
shooting only to discover that he is shooting his own people. During the civil
war, we sustained lots of casualties as a result of this situation. So, my
suspicion is that a similar situation must have played out during that
operation in Abuja and a bullet hit the late Ibrahim (Bako).
Question: So, claims that General Tunde Ogbeha may have pulled the
trigger on Bako are not correct after all?
Babangida: I would not like to say he did it, no. It was the
situation they found themselves; it was dark and everybody was shooting
anyhow.
2) Former President Shagaris
Account. In his memoirs Beckoned to Serve, Shagari said that
Captain Anyogo (a company commander of the Brigade of Guards) narrated to him,
the story of how Bako was killed. According to Shagari, Anyongo told him:
I was the company commander of the
guard battalion of Abuja during the change of government in December,
1983. Neither I nor members of my guard were informed of the impending
change of government, and in the process of finding out what group soldiers
were trying to change the government, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako and my driver,
Private Sule were shot and killed, when I entered into the ambush mounted by
Recce troops brought by the officers from Kaduna. This happened about 11
kilometres away from the State House where ex-President Alhaji Shehu Shagari
was staying. The officers, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako and Lt-Colonel Tunde
Ogbeha were both in civilian dresses during the operation and they did not
identify themselves to me as senior officers. At this time there were
rumours that some junior officers were planning to take over government and we
were careful this was happening in our area of jurisdiction. The two
officers were disarmed and put in front of my vehicle and we were on our way to
the State House of Abuja under the orders of my commanding officer Lt-Colonel
Eboma. When we entered into the ambush it was Lt-Colonel Tunde Ogbeha who
jumped in front of my vehicle when somebody shouted the order, fire him. In
the resultant ambush firing, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako and my driver Sule died. (Shagari Beckoned to Serve)
3) Vice-Admiral Akin Aduwos
Account. Vice-Admiral Aduwo was President Shagaris Chief of
Naval Staff. In an interview published in the Saturday, January 13, 2007
edition of the Sun, Aduwo said that:
They sent Brigadier Ibrahim Bako to
arrest him ( Shagari) at the then uncompleted presidential lodge Akinola
Aguda House.
..Bako got to the gate, stopped his Landrover and even disarmed
himself, left his pistol. He said, this man is a friend to my father, and
that he would go to him alone. He went to Shagari and told him there had been a
change of government. And that he would guarantee his safety. No force but with
all due respect and courtesy. Shagari said to him, all right, please let me
say my prayers. And Bako said, okay sir, I will be waiting outside. As he
was walking out of that place, maybe the ADC or security you have to pass
before entering the presidents living room. As Bako was coming out, there was
a gun shot from the security room, and it finished him.
What these three differing accounts
demonstrate is that no one really knows, or is willing to admit, how Bako
died. Bako was buried in Kaduna on 3rd January 1984.
Maj-Gen Muhammadu Buhari became the new Head of State. Babangida later
denied rumours that Bako would have become Head of State had he not been
killed. He also revealed that he was approached to become the new Head of
State but declined as Buhari was our senior, so I did not want anybody to
jump him.
An Offshoot From Obasanjo
Alleged links between General
Olusegun Obasanjo and the new military regime were tacitly acknowledged in
public when the new regime emphasised that it was an offshoot of the
Murtala-Obasanjo regime that governed between 1976-1979. This was
entirely accurate because many of the new regimes senior figures such as
Buhari, Babangida, Ukiwe, Kpera, and Garba Duba all served under the 1976-1979
regime. Babangida was appointed Chief of Army Staff to succeed Lt-General
Mohammed Wushishi. His old class mate Maj-Gen Mamman Vatsa was appointed
Minister of the Federal Capital Territory outside the army chain of command,
in a move that prevented either of the former coursemates from serving under
other each other.
Babangida and Brigadier Tunde
Idiagbon informed Wushishi and the other service chiefs Lt-Gen Gibson Jalo
(Chief of Defence Staff), Air Vice Marshal Abdullahi Dominic Bello (Chief of
Air Staff), and Vice-Admiral Akin Aduwo (Chief of Naval Staff), that their
services were no longer required and that they would be detained at Bonny Camp
in Lagos under protective custody. All the former service chiefs were
compulsorily retired. President Shagari emerged from hiding and joined
the other military and civilian detainees after being given assurances that he
would not be harmed.

Trouble In Paradise - The Babangida Factor
The new regime led by Buhari was an
austere regime whose major policy platform was a massive crackdown on
corruption. As the anti-corruption drive by Buhari widened, the trail of
investigations led back to the Ministry of Defence. There were allegations that
senior army officers were involved in drug dealing and rumours of some
suspicious financial dealings at the Ministry. Some accusatory fingers
were pointed at Babangida. Additionally several sources have stated that
these investigations led to a decision to retire Babangidas close ally Colonel
Aliyu Mohammed. Babangida also claimed that the NSO was monitoring the
activities of SMC members, and had even bugged his own telephone lines.
Babangida said he later retrieved most of the tapes of the NSO's wiretaps on
his phones. Why was he so keen to recover the tapes? Buhari compounded
his problems by not rewarding the key junior and mid-ranking officers who
staged the coup that brought him to power with lucrative political
postings. This created discontent among officers who were essentially
coup specialists. Other officers in the government and junior officers
took their complaints to Babangida. A cleavage opened up in the SMC with
Buhari, Idiagbon, Mohammed Magoro (Internal Affairs Minister) and Alhaji Lawal
Rafindadi (Director of the National Security Organisation) on one side and
Babangida heading the opposition. Babangida had to do something drastic
to save his neck. He had to overthrow Buhari to ensure his
survival. According to Babangida, the planning to overthrow Buhari began
in January 1985 - just one year after Buhari came to office. The period of time
between April and July 1985 was the most critical phase in the planning.
Babangida says it was a "collective decision" to overthrow Buhari.
There was a subtle plot by Babangida loyalists to discredit Buharis
regime. They would sanction moves which were publicly unpopular and which
made Buharis regime appear harsh and unsympathetic. These included the
arrest and detention of government opponents and journalists, the execution of
drug dealers, a raid on the home of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and the seizure of
his passport, and the stifling of political debate on when the country would be
returned to civilian rule. Buhari took the blame for these decisions but
later revealed that they were sanctioned by the same men that overthrew
him. It was all part of a plot to make the regime unpopular enough to
justify public support for a military coup and Buharis replacement by
Babangida. Babangida later admitted as much:
There was a lot going in our
favour. So we seized the moment
..You see we are very smart
people. We dont intervene when we know the climate is not good for it or
the public will not welcome it. We wait until there is a frustration in
the society. In all the coups, you find there has always been one
frustration or the other. Any time there is frustration we step in. And
then there is demonstration welcoming the redeemers.
(Karl Maier Midnight in Nigeria)
While Buhari was stern, serious and
resolute, Babangida was deft, tactical and extremely devious. He had
systematically cultivated a loyal following of sycophantic mid-ranking officers
over the years by making grandiose gestures and buying lavish presents for
officers junior to him. These officers now owed allegiance to him rather
than to their nation, institution, or to the Head of State Buhari.
Babangida had managed to create a mini-personality cult within the
military. A military intelligence officer Chris MC Alli later observed
that:
"Major General Ibrahim
Babangida sat atop the strategic office of Chief of Army Staff. This
conspiratorial group and their cohorts properly circumscribed General Buhari
and Major General Idiagbon. Most transitional coups in Nigeria have revolved
around the following; late, Brigadier General Ibrahim Bako, a brilliant
Armoured Corps officer who died in unexplained circumstances in the 1983 coup
d'etat that sent President Shehu Shagari packing. others were, General Murtala
Mohammed, Major General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, an accomplished strategist of vast
resources and the hero of the Onitsha campaign, General Ibrahim Badamasi
Babangida and General Sani Abacha. These were the carpetbaggers, the first tier
of coup merchants. The second was forming around the officers of Nigeria
Defence Academy Course Three and by 1985 they were mostly lieutenant colonels.
A new crop of officers were further tacitly being groomed into this brand of
schemers, the third tier which formed around General Babangida and had such
young officers such as Lawan Gwadabe, Ibrahim Dasuki* (sic), John (Yohana)
Madaki, to name a few. So, there were first and second lines with the third in
a state of gestation, all aimed at ensuring the sustenance of the status quo
and power equation in the nation. Each would protect the previous from its
horrid shadows while in power. They were all northern in their political
orientations and composition". (Maj-Gen
Chris Alli, The Federal Republic of Nigerian Army: The Siege of a Nation)
*This was an error by Alli. He
obviously meant Sambo Dasuki the son of the former Sultan of Sokoto Ibrahim
Dasuki.
The second coup plotter tier
described by Alli were the same men who brought Buhari to power. However
with his superior charm, Babangida could easily convince these men to switch
loyalty and abandon Buhari. Although Buhari was his close friend, for
Babangida, this was pure business. Babangida later claimed that: To
be able to stage a coup you have to be close to somebody. I was a very good
friend of Buhari, theres no doubt about it.
However there was a sticking
point. The GOC of the 2nd division in Ibadan, Maj-Gen Sani
Abacha was a mysterious figure. If Babangida could not obtain his support
for the coup, it would fail and Babangida and his friends would end up in front
of a firing squad. Babangida went to Abacha to personally plead for his
support in deposing Buhari. Only Babangida could talk him round.
According to Babangida
Nobody could get him [Abacha] to be
involved except me because of our relationship. If it were any other
person, he would have gone to the side of Buhari. But when I sat him
down, he said You are my chief, anything you want I will do. So the personal
relationship also helped in trying to recruit people into this unholy
alliance.
Next Part: Babangida is the only Nigerian military leader that
actively sought political power prior to coming to office, prepared for it and
waited patiently for it to come his way. He was probably the most
prepared military ruler in Nigeria's history.
maxsiollun@yahoo.com
http://maxsiollun.wordpress.com/

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Posted by Robot| 28.05.2008 17:23