Part I: The Defeat of the ‘Allies on War on Terror’ moves to Somalia

This week has witnessed the further deterioration of the security situation in Somalia leading to an estimated 300 000 civilians fleeing the cities and huddling in refugee camps according to UNHCR and an estimated 1 300 bodies lying and rotting on Mogadishu streets. While the United Nations Security Council has also joined the chorus of warning about a human catastrophe in the making, drawing the attention of the international community to the unfolding crisis in the Horn, the underlying reasons for the conflict continue to be located firmly in the arena of War on Terror and how that has become a scapegoat for influencing dynamics in otherwise purely African and traditional conflicts.

Battling for control of the souls of cities of Mogadishu , Kismayo and Adado are Ethiopian conventional forces; complete with tanks supported by US air and naval assets located just offshore in the Indian Ocean . The contingents have also nominal support from 1 500 Ugandans who have skilfully shied away from engaging in the traditional struggle that has pitted Ethiopia and Somalia for decades. [Anecdotal evidence has revealed that the Ugandans have appropriated for themselves the role of protecting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Interim President Abdullai   Yusuf .  However, for anyone familiar with insurgency warfare, the signs are increasingly pointing towards an early and humiliating defeat of the Allies on War on Terror on African soil in Somalia- at least in the long-term.

What explains this new trend? First, the international dimensions are being carefully watched by the key actors in the conflict, namely, President George   W.   Bush and the Democratic Party offensive in Congress, attempting to link current funding of the US troops in Iraqi with a clear timetable for withdrawal by October? Although Bush has indicated that he is going to veto the bill when it arrives on his table, the die has been cast for a fractitious and divided US Congress on the issue of commitment on the War in Iraqi. Stated differently, even if Bush eventually has his way in Congress, the bipartisan legitimacy of the support of the war in Iraqi has been lost. This has implications for a cohesive and united front in theatre of operations.

The second major component explaining the war dynamics in Somali is local. In December 2006, the Ethiopians, with now acknowledge US support deployed a conventional force in Mogadishu , against the Islamic Union Courts (ICU), ostensibly in support of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of interim President A.   Yussuf . This quick military action was partially successful, leading to many “Al-Quida” linked leaders scattering and some of them captured on the Somali-Kenya border. During the operation, Ethiopia promised a surgical four-week operation that would end with the deployment of an 8 000 African Union (AU) force. However, of the many countries that had lined up under the umbrella of the regional security organisation, Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), only Uganda has recently deployed a 1 500 force after considerable procrastination and delay. The Malawians, once slated as a likely contributor, have since withdrawn their offer. Furthermore, Eritrea , one of the seven members of IGAD has since formally withdrawn from that regional security organisation.

What is left in place in Somalia are contingents from Ethiopia and Uganda, at the moment enjoying tacit support from the Bush Administration, support that may or may not evaporate if the Republicans lose office in 2008. Clearly, what is on the ground is former USA Allies in Iraqi from Africa – Ethiopia and Uganda, countries that have continued to find common cause on the continent against what is perceived as an unjust assault on Moslems, dominant in Somalia through the ICU.

The now defeated ICU and other clan leaders by the conventional force marshalled by Ethiopia are unlikely to disappear as reports of their coming together for long-term guerrilla warfare have already begun to circulate. However, the AU has demonstrated that it has no capacity to mount and sustain a long-drawn peacekeeping operation that smacks of a Chapter VII, Enforcement. At present, the continental body is struggling to put together the authorised UN 20 000 force for Darfur and to expect the same to respond adequately to the situation in Somalia is expecting miracles that are unlikely to be realized.